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ABSTRACT 
Graff, Christopher  Constructing a Narrative of Irish Republicanism, 
1913-1921. 
The Easter Rising of 1916 and subsequent Anglo-Irish War were two seminal events in 
contemporary Irish history, and are especially pertinent as the 100
th
 anniversary of the Rising 
approaches this year. In this thesis, I examine the underlying causes of the Easter Rising, 
specifically the growing influence of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and an increase in Irish 
Nationalism. I then trace the planning, preparation, and execution of the Easter Rising, which 
was not a popular uprising, but rather an armed insurrection led by a small group of militarized 
radicals. I also analyze the political, social, and economic consequences of the failed Rising, 
which inevitably led to a continuation of hostilities during the Anglo-Irish War, one of the 
earliest recorded instances of urban and rural guerrilla warfare. Finally, I examine the tactics 
used by the Irish Republican Army during the Anglo-Irish War, which enabled them to best a 
better trained, better equipped, and professional military force through the use of highly refined 
guerrilla tactics and the growing support of the Irish population.  
This study utilizes numerous oral histories collected by the Irish Bureau of Military 
History, published memoirs of notable figures from the Republican movement, archived 
newspaper articles, and other historical publications to construct a narrative of the events as seen 
through the eyes of the participants. Careful analysis of this narrative deconstructs the chain of 
3 
 
events, and seeks to further explain how such wanton acts of violence occurred in a Western, 
modern, and industrialized state.  
The results of the Anglo-Irish War continue to have direct political effects today, as some 
small terrorist groups in Northern Ireland continue to claim lineage from, or at least the 
namesake of, the group founded by Irish Nationalists in 1913 and reorganized by the Dáil 
Eireann in 1919. An understanding of the historical context behind this group is necessary to 
fully grasp the contemporary political situation, and explain the bulk of 20
th
 Century Irish 
history, especially “The Troubles” of Northern Ireland.  
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Introduction 
 
“We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the 
unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that 
right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be 
extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish People.”1 These words, written by Patrick 
Henry Pearse, announced the proclamation of a new Irish Republic, which Pearse and his 
followers would die to defend. Although the Irish had revolted against English rule many times 
in the past, there was something distinctly different about the Easter Rising of 1916 and 
subsequent Anglo-Irish War. Suddenly, Irishmen from all walks of life were eager to question 
the legitimacy of British rule, and many were willing to take up arms in order to fight for the 
Republic proclaimed by Pearse. The notion of the Irish Republic soon became sacred to those 
who believed in it, and many became prepared to give up their lives, as Pearse had, in order to 
defend their idealized Republic. 
The Easter Rising and Anglo-Irish War were two seminal events in contemporary Irish 
history, and are especially pertinent as the 100
th
 anniversary of the Rising approaches this year. 
In this thesis, I examine the underlying causes of the Easter Rising, specifically the growing 
influence of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and rise of Irish nationalism, which drastically 
increased around the turn of the 20
th
 century. I then trace the planning, preparation, and 
execution of the Easter Rising, and analyze the political, social, and economic consequences of 
its failure – which inevitably led to a continuation of hostilities during the Anglo-Irish War. The 
Anglo-Irish War proved to be an intense and bloody struggle, and was one of the earliest 
                                               
1 Patrick Henry Pearse, Letters from PH Pearse. ed Séamas Ó Buachalla. (Colin Smythe: Gerrards Cross, 1980) p. 
366. 
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recorded instances of urban guerrilla warfare. Men were not simply killed on the battlefield, but 
were gunned down while walking through the streets of Dublin or sleeping in their own beds.  
This study utilizes numerous oral histories collected by the Irish Bureau of Military 
History, which was staffed by Irish Army officers and civil servants who interviewed many 
members the aging revolutionary generation from 1947 to 1957. The bureau also collected 
letters, documents, and witness statements written and submitted by participants in national 
activities in order to chronical the events of the Republican movement which occurred between 
1913 and 1921.
2
 Other primary sources examined in this thesis include the published memoirs of 
notable figures such as Desmond Fitzgerald and Michael Brennan, archived British and Irish 
newspaper articles, and other historical publications such as Bulmer Hobson’s History of the 
Irish Volunteers Vol. 1. These various primary sources all help to construct a narrative of the 
events as seen through the eyes of the participants, and discuss events such as meetings, battles, 
or imprisonments, which otherwise would have gone unrecorded in official documents. 
Many scholarly works have been written about both the Easter Rising and the Anglo-Irish 
War. Charles Townshend’s Easter 1916 (2006) provides a careful examination of events, and 
utilizes many British government documents to artfully paint a well-rounded picture of the 
conflict from both Irish and British perspectives. Townshend also provides a detailed narrative of 
the Rising itself, outlining exactly what occurred where, and when, during Easter Week of 1916. 
Edgar Holt’s Protest in Arms (1961) constructs a chain of events that took place from the 
formation of the Irish Volunteers through the Irish Civil War, and provides valuable background 
information on the conflict, as well a detailed account of many famous occurrences. Other 
                                               
2 Irish Bureau of Military History, “Guide to the Bureau of Military History,” last modified 2016. 
http://www.bureauofmilitaryhistory.ie/about.html 
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notable works include Hart’s The IRA and Its Enemies (1998) and The IRA at War (2003), 
Townshend’s The British Campaign in Ireland (1975), and F.X. Martin’s edited and annotated 
collection of documents, The Irish Volunteers: Recollections & Documents (1963).
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. A Nation Once Again 
Historical Rebellions 
 
                                               
3 F.X. Martin’s work has been republished in 2013 for its 50th anniversary, and it is that version which is cited in this 
paper.  
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Since the English first arrived in Ireland during the 12
th
 century, there has been a long 
history of resistance and insurrection against the British forces.  Animosity between the Irish and 
English increased when Henry VIII split from the Catholic Church, since the great majority of 
the Irish refused to abandon Catholicism, and many Englishman began to fear they might 
collaborate with England’s Catholic enemies, such as France and Spain.4 The situation was 
exacerbated by a series of hostilities, including the Tyrone Rebellion led by Hugh O’Neill at the 
end of the 16
th
 Century, as well as a minor rebellion led by Cahir O’Doherty in 1608.5 In 
response, the English Parliament enacted the Articles of Plantation in 1609, which enabled the 
Crown to seize land from those who participated in the previous rebellions, and then distribute 
those lands to Protestant English settlers who were willing to colonize Ulster and establish an 
English stronghold in Northern Ireland (which in effect, still exists today).
6
 The establishment of 
a Protestant colony in Ulster sowed the seeds for a conflict between Protestant and Catholic 
Irishmen that has been ongoing for centuries.  
After the arrival of the English settlers there were further rebellions in 1641, 1798, 1848, 
and 1867. By 1798 many Irish had been influenced by the ideals of the American and French 
revolutions, and over time there was an increase in Irish nationalism and desire for autonomy 
from the British Empire.
7
 Although every rebellion eventually failed, the rebellion of 1867 
proved to have lasting consequences which would shape the Irish Republican movement in the 
early 20
th
 century. The 1867 uprising was led by members of the Fenian Brotherhood, which was 
                                               
4
 Bruce Nelson, Irish Nationalism and the Making of the Irish Race. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) p. 
19 
5 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Ireland", accessed February 12, 2016. 
http://www.britannica.com/place/Ireland/The-Shane-ONeill-rebellion. And Mike Cronin, A History of Ireland. (New 
York: Palgrave, 2001) p.64.  
6 Cronin. p. 65.  
7 Nelson. p. 24.  
9 
 
established by John O’Mahoney and James Stephens,8 and led by some survivors of the Young 
Ireland Movement – the organization responsible for the 1848 rebellion.9 The Fenian 
Brotherhood grew steadily throughout the 1860’s, and both O’Mahoney and Stephens traveled 
abroad to rally support for the organization and collect financial contributions from Irish 
emigres, especially in New York where O’Mahoney was quite successful in garnering aid. The 
Fenians looked back at the failed rebellions of the 17
th
, 18
th
, and 19
th
 centuries, and decided their 
only chance for success was to stage an armed insurrection across the entire country.
10
 
One of the failures of the 1848 rebellion was the lack of support the rebels had among the 
general population. However, the Irish people were still devastated by the Great Famine, which 
had killed roughly 1/8
th
 of the population and forced countless others to emigrate.
11
  Without the 
basic ability to put food on the table many simply did not have the time or energy to get involved 
with political affairs. In an attempt to garner popular support for their uprising, the Fenians 
began publishing periodicals and pamphlets, including The Irish People, which was first 
published in 1861. Furthermore, many members of the Fenian Brotherhood traveled to the 
United States and fought in the Irish Brigade during the U.S. Civil War, which gave them crucial 
military training and experience that they planned on using upon their return to Ireland. Some 
Fenians even launched an invasion into Canada in 1866, with the hopes their raids against a 
British territory would bring the British Government to the negotiating table.
12
 Finally, on March 
                                               
8 Cronin p. 150.  
9
Charles Townshend, Easter 1916. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006) p. 3.  
10 Cronin p. 150.  
11 Cronin p. 147.  
12 “The Fenian Raid and Battle of Ridgeway June 1-3, 1866.” Last modified 1 June 2014. 
http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~dbertuca/155/FenianRaid.html 
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5, 1867, the Fenians began their rebellion by attacking police barracks, derailing trains, and 
sabotaging telegraph lines across the country.
13
  
The Fenian uprising of 1867, like all the uprisings that preceded it, failed to break the 
British hold on Ireland. The Fenians failed to acquire adequate arms and ammunition, were 
easily infiltrated by British agents, and as much as they tried failed to get enough popular support 
from the Irish people. By the end of the year the Fenians were defeated and the rebellion was put 
down.
14
 However, the secret society of Fenian Brotherhood was not completely destroyed, and 
continued on as the Irish Republican Brotherhood, or I.R.B (although even during the 20
th
 
century many still referred to members of the I.R.B. as “Fenians”). The I.R.B. became an 
important organization for Irish nationalists, and was always quietly pushing for open rebellion 
against the British, in contrast to other nationalists who preferred fighting for independence (or at 
least autonomy) within the British parliamentary system.
15
 Many leading Irish nationalists 
belonged to the Brotherhood, and in the years before the Rising there was a systematic attempt to 
get members of the I.R.B. appointed as leading members of the varying nationalist and 
republican movements. The legend of the Fenian uprising in ’67 also became an important 
rallying cry for nationalists in the 20
th
 century, and along with the other major rebellions, became 
a source of inspiration for many members of the Irish Volunteers. 
 
 
Growth of the I.R.B.  
 
                                               
13 Cronin. pp. 151-152.  
14 Cronin. p. 152.  
15 Townshend, Easter 1916. p. 4. 
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 Although the Irish Republican Brotherhood had existed since 1858, in the years after the 
Fenian uprising of 1867 it became less active until the turn of the 20
th
 century.  The Brotherhood 
was organized in Circles, which were tightly knit groups of people sworn to secrecy and 
established in cities or towns. Each Circle had a Center, who was in charge of leading the Circle 
and communicating with the I.R.B. Supreme Council.  Ernest Blythe, a member of both the 
I.R.B. and Irish Volunteers, met with members of the old Fenian movement in Ulster after he got 
involved in a more active I.R.B circle in the early 1900’s. Blythe wrote: 
I formed a rather poor opinion of the remains of the I.R.B. There were only one or 
two senior members in the neighborhood, and, while they were very good fellows, 
I saw that all they were doing was maintaining a tradition and that it would never 
be possible to get them to make much of a public move. […] The only thing that 
the I.R.B. did there was keep alive a feeling of dislike and distrust of the 
Hibernians
16
 and of the Parliamentary movement, and cause a few young people 
to read “Sinn Fein” or “Irish Freedom.17 
 However, as more Nationalist organizations were formed, such as the Gaelic Athletic 
Association (G.A.A.) or Gaelic League (established in 1884 and 1893, respectively), the I.R.B. 
began to grow again. Not all I.R.B. Circles suffered the same decline as the Ulster Circle Blythe 
described, and sincere efforts to reform the organization by eliminating drunkards and recruiting 
younger members were undertaken.
18
 Blythe admitted that when he was recruited into the I.R.B. 
in 1907 “the main activity [of the I.R.B.] was simply recruiting,” and in the first decade of the 
20
th
 century many new enthusiastic members were sworn in to the I.R.B.
19
  
 The I.R.B. was a secret society, and therefore potential members had to be invited to join, 
unlike other republican movements that were largely open to anyone. One member of the Belfast 
                                               
16 The Hibernians were an Irish Catholic order associated with the Irish Parliamentary Party, which opposed the 
Fenian desire to wage open rebellion against the British.  
17 BMH WS 939 (Ernest Blythe) p. 17.  
18 BMH WS 914 (Denis McCullough)  p. 2.  
19 BMH WS 939 (Ernest Blythe) p. 3.  
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Circle wrote that, “the selection of new recruits was a subject of extreme care,” and that potential 
members were carefully watched and evaluated by current members of the Circle before being 
invited to join.
20
 Typically, an I.R.B. Circle was affiliated with a social club or nationalist 
organization, which was used to attract potential recruits. In his witness statement Blythe 
recounts that he felt a strong desire to learn Irish, so he joined the Gaelic League and later an 
affiliated hurling club. Through these organizations Blythe made a friend, who informed him 
“that the Fenian organization was still alive and was again recruiting young men,” and that “their 
policy was to prepare to make open war on England.”21 However, Blythe’s friend approached 
him prematurely (without consulting other members of his Circle) and therefore needed to get 
permission from his superiors within the I.R.B. to formally swear Blythe into the Circle.  
 Blythe’s case was quite common, as the I.R.B. used the Gaelic League, Gaelic Athletic 
Association, and the Fianna Éireann (the Irish Boy Scout organization) to recruit young men. 
The Fianna especially became a hotbed of recruiting for both the I.R.B. and Irish Volunteers, and 
became so closely associated with the Volunteer movement that one Irish Volunteer wrote he 
“graduated from the Fianna to the Volunteers.”22  Michael Brennan, a former member of the 
Fianna, stated that “The Fianna were closely associated with the Wolfe Tone Club, which I later 
discovered was only a cover for an I.R.B. Circle.”23 In some circumstances, members of the 
I.R.B. even accompanied those in the Fianna on training exercises or marches. Brennan’s brother 
was already a member of the I.R.B. while he was in the Fianna, and was given special 
permission to join the I.R.B. at 15 (most sworn into the I.R.B. were typically a few years older – 
17 or 18), however this was an exception to the norm. In the Fianna, young boys were taught 
                                               
20 BMH WS 223 (Robert Haskin) p. 2. 
21 BMH WS 939 (Ernest Blythe) pp. 1-2.   
22 BMH WS 461 (Joseph Byrne) p. 1.  
23 Michael Brennan, The War in Clare. (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1980) p. 7.  
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things such as “first aid, musketry, [and] scouting,” as well as introductory lessons in the Irish 
Language.
24
 These skills were put to use by both the I.R.B. and the Irish Volunteers, especially 
during the Easter Rising of 1916 and the Anglo-Irish War that occurred from 1919 to 1921. 
During both of these conflicts the Fianna took and active role in aiding the Irish Volunteers, and 
did much more than train potential recruits.  
 In essence, the I.R.B. operated as a sort of shadow organization, controlling or 
influencing various nationalist organizations, with the eventual goal of staging an armed 
rebellion against the British. The Chairman of the I.R.B. Supreme Council during the Easter 
Rising, Denis McCullough, admitted that:  
The I.R.B. worked through Sinn Féin, the Gaelic League, the G.A.A. and 
eventually through the Irish Volunteers, having key-men in each of them, to 
influence their policy in the direction required.
25
  
The goal for the I.R.B. was, and always had been, armed rebellion, and by utilizing these various 
nationalist organizations, they would soon have what they desired.  
 
 
The Specter of Home Rule and the Ulster Volunteer Force 
 
After the numerous Irish rebellions, the British Parliament contemplated granting Ireland 
limited autonomy within the United Kingdom and establishing an Irish Parliament in Dublin. 
However, this idea was always intensely contested in England, and two Home Rule bills were 
voted down by the British Parliament in 1886 and 1893.
26
 In 1910 the British Prime Minister, 
                                               
24 BMH WS 191 (Joseph Reynolds) p. 1.  
25 BMH WS 914 (Denis McCullough) p. 4.   
26 Townshend, Easter 1916. p. 29.  
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Herbert Henry Asquith, announced that a new, third, Home Rule Bill was in the works. Many 
British conservatives, especially members of the House of Lords and Tory Party, were fiercely 
opposed to granting any sort of autonomy to Ireland. Within Ireland, many Protestant loyalists, 
especially those living in Ulster (who were largely the decedents of the English settlers who were 
sent to colonize Ulster in 1609), were terrified by the idea of Home Rule, fearing it would make 
them vulnerable to discrimination from Irish Catholics. In January of 1912, the Ulster Unionist 
Council met and openly declared its position against Home Rule. The Council reported:  
It is not a request for a distinctive Ulster Parliament. It is simply a demand, made 
in the interests of our fellow-Unionists in all parts of Ireland, as well as of our 
own, that our Northern province shall continue to possess the exact constitutional 
privileges and rights which, in common with her British fellow-citizens, she 
enjoys today as an integral part of the United Kingdom, and that she shall 
continue to be represented on equal terms with Great Britain in the Imperial 
Parliament.
27
 
In response, Sir Edward Carson, the leader of the Irish Unionist Parliamentary Party, formed a 
paramilitary organization called the Ulster Volunteer Force 1912.  
Bulmer Hobson, a leading member in the I.R.B. and founding member of the Irish 
Volunteers, argued that the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force was the most significant 
catalyst for the formation of the Irish Volunteers. Hobson wrote:  
If we must find a founder for every movement, I should say that Sir Edward 
Carson has strong claims to be considered the founder of the Irish Volunteers, for 
they were the logical and necessary outcome of the Volunteer movement 
organized in Ulster the year before.
28
 
Hobson, along with other prominent Irish Republican leaders, viewed the Ulster Volunteers not 
as a group of people organizing to protect their own rights, but rather a tool of English 
                                               
27 "ULSTER AND THE UNION." The Irish Times (1874-1920): 4. Jan 04 1912. ProQuest. Web. 15 Feb. 2016. 
28 Bulmer Hobson, A Short History of the Irish Volunteers. (Dublin: The Candle Press, 1918) p. 16.  
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“Imperialists” used to derail the Home Rule Bill in Parliament.29 Carson and the Ulster 
Volunteers threatened rebellion if County Ulster was included in the Home Rule Bill, prompting 
many within the English government to push for the exclusion of Ulster from Home Rule.
30
  
However, the potential exclusion of Ulster enraged many Irish nationalists who wanted to avoid 
any partition of the country. Furthermore, men like Hobson viewed the training and arming of 
the Ulster Volunteers as a direct threat to the physical safety of the Irish outside Ulster. In his 
book, History of the Irish Volunteers Vol. 1, Hobson claimed that “men were openly recruited in 
England, Scotland, and the English Colonies for the purpose of levying a war on the Nationals of 
Ireland.”31 Although Hobson’s book was published in 1918 after the failed Easter Rising, and 
was likely written at least in part as propaganda to inspire Irish Republicans to continue to the 
fight against the British, it is undeniable that the British Government turned a blind eye to many 
activities of the Ulster Volunteers that were not entirely legal, and essentially allowed the Ulster 
Volunteers to arm. However, many Unionists (those who supported loyalty to the British 
Parliament and argued against Home Rule) genuinely felt that Home Rule would be an injustice 
to Ulster, which had demographics unlike any other county in Ireland, and did largely wish to 
remain integrated into the United Kingdom.
32
  
While Parliament was debating the Home Rule bill, there were massive demonstrations 
by Unionists in Northern Ireland. The Weekly Irish Times reported that on January 13, 1912 
nearly 20,000 men gathered in Omagh to “reiterate and reaffirm the declaration of the Great 
                                               
29 Hobson p. 11. 
30 Hobson p. 2.  
31 Hobson p. 10.  
32 A.V. Dicey, “Facts for Unionists” Times [London, England] 8 April. 1913: 6. The Times Digital Archive. Web. 5 
Feb. 2016. 
16 
 
Ulster Convention of 1893, ‘We will not have Home Rule.’”33 The Ulster Volunteers would 
frequently parade, demonstrate, and drill as a show of force in the community, just as the Irish 
Volunteers would do later. A typical slogan of the Ulster Volunteers was, “Ulster will fight and 
Ulster will be right.”34 The Protestant community was largely supportive of their demonstrations, 
and even kids could sometimes be heard shouting “no to Home Rule and to hell with the Pope.”35 
 Elizabeth Bloxham, an active member of the Cumann na mBan and Irish Nationalist, was 
a Protestant who grew up in Ulster. Bloxham described that her family was never especially 
political, but wrote that “being Protestants, we were, as a matter of course, Unionists.”36 
Bloxham believed that in Ulster religion and politics were inherently intertwined, and knew that 
many of her former friends and acquaintances judged her harshly when they found out she had 
become a nationalist, writing “of course, the Protestant community would deplore my defection 
from the Unionism which was so closely linked with our religion.”37 Bloxham even described 
that in her Protestant Church, “the Preacher asserted that his political opponents were actuated 
solely by a desire to crush the Protestant religion and to take from the Protestants their way of 
living.”38 Of course, not all Protestants were Unionists, and Bloxham discussed that some people 
(who also happened to be Ulster Protestants) would quietly approach her to voice their support 
for her speaking out in favor of the nationalist cause. Other prominent Nationalists, like Ernest 
Blythe, were also Protestants, and in general it seems that Nationalist and Republican 
organizations were eager accept Protestants into their ranks, so long as their political views 
coincided with their own. However, sectarian animosity was also present outside of Ulster, and 
                                               
33
 "UNIONIST CAMPAIGN IN ULSTER." Weekly Irish Times (1876-1920): 5. Jan 13 1912. ProQuest. Web. 15 
Feb. 2016 . 
34 BMH WS 632 (Elizabeth Bloxham) p. 23.  
35 BMH WS 632 (Elizabeth Bloxham) p. 15.  
36 BMH WS 632 (Elizabeth Bloxham) p. 1.  
37 BMH WS 632 (Elizabeth Bloxham) p. 5.  
38 BMH WS 632 (Elizabeth Bloxham) p. 13.  
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even Blythe admitted that he was initially reluctant to join the Gaelic League because he felt he 
would be expelled from the league if other members learned of his Protestant heritage.
39
 Clearly, 
despite the romanticized notion that Catholics and Protestants worked together within the early 
nationalist movement, religion created a social barrier for many people.  
 
Establishment of the Irish Volunteers  
 
The Irish Nationalists response to the threat of the Ulster Volunteers was to establish their 
own paramilitary organization. In July of 1913 Hobson attended a meeting with other leading 
Nationalists to discuss the formation of the Volunteers, but decided to wait a few months before 
taking any action, in the hopes that the Ulster Volunteers might receive more negative press 
throughout the country and the bulk of the Irish people would become more susceptible to the 
idea of a nationalist volunteer organization.
40
  Several months later, in late October, the first 
meeting of the Provisional Committee for the Irish Volunteers was held at Wynn’s Hotel in 
Dublin. Eoin MacNeill, a well-known professor, intellectual, and Irish nationalist, was 
approached by Hobson and Michael Joseph O’Rahilly (posthumously referred to by many as 
“The” O’Rahilly), and brought on to act as chair of the committee. Those present at the first 
meeting included MacNeill, O’Rahilly, John Fitzgibbon, Sean MacDermott (frequently spelled 
in Irish as Mac Diarmada), Eamonn Kent, Peirce Beasley, Seumas O’Connor, Robert Page, P.H. 
Pearse, and several others who would end up leaving the committee.
41
   
                                               
39 BMH WS 939 (Ernest Blythe) p. 1. 
40 Hobson. p. 17.  
41 Hobson. p. 17.  
18 
 
One of the first desires of those present at the committee meeting was to include other 
nationalist groups in their plans to form a Volunteer organization,
42
 since other nationalist 
organizations such as the Hibernians and those affiliated with the Irish Parliamentary Party were 
not initially supportive of the Provisional Committee’s goals.  The nationalist (or Republican) 
movement was quite disjoined in contrast to the Unionist movement, which was relatively 
cohesive under the guidance of Carson and the Ulster Volunteers. Although organizations like 
the G.A.A., Gaelic League, Sinn Fein (one of the nationalist political parties), the Irish 
Volunteers, and the I.R.B. were generally connected together through men who had overlapping 
membership in several multiple organizations, they were not officially affiliated with one 
another. John Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary had vastly different ideas and approaches 
than the other nationalist organizations.  Desmond Fitzgerald, an organizer for the Irish 
Volunteers and fervent anti-Redmondite, wrote that “on the whole we rather hoped and expected 
that the Home Rule Bill would become law, but we looked upon the Irish Party as enemies.”43  
Later, in 1914, figures from other nationalist organizations were invited to join the Provisional 
Committee of the Irish Volunteers, but Hobson wrote that only a third were Redmond supporters 
and less than half had ever been affiliated with Sinn Fein.  Like the Hibernians, Redmond and his 
supporters were determined to gain Home Rule or some form of Irish autonomy through the 
established political process, and fiercely opposed any notion of an armed rebellion against the 
British. Although many followers of Redmond were nationalists, they also felt pride in being a 
part of the British Empire and United Kingdom, and wanted autonomy without complete 
separation.  
                                               
42 Hobson. p. 18.  
43 Desmond Fitzgerald, Memoirs of Desmond FitzGerald.(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968) p. 33.  
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Another initial undertaking of the Provisional Committee was to publish a Manifesto of 
the Irish Volunteers. The Manifesto attempted to declare the righteous nature of the Irish 
Volunteers, and stated that “the object proposed for the Irish Volunteers is to secure and maintain 
the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland.”44 The manifesto also stressed that 
any member of Irish society could take part in the movement, regardless of age, sex, religion, or 
socioeconomic status, and it made clear that even those unfit for military service could aid the 
Volunteers in other ways (such as by donating for the purchase of arms, supporting their rallies, 
preparing food and equipment, etc.). Rather than appeal to a sectarian divide between Protestants 
and Catholics, men were called upon to support the movement “in the name of National Unity, of 
National Dignity, [and] of National and Individual Liberty.”45  However, as much as the 
Provisional Committee attempted to downplay any sectarian aspect of the conflict, religion still 
weighed heavy on people’s minds. Just as Bloxham described how Protestant nationalists were 
scorned, many Catholics felt they could not openly support the Unionists. In one letter to the 
editor published in the Irish Times, the author wrote that “if a Roman Catholic fights on the side 
of the Union he is looked upon as a sort of traitor by one side, and a suspect by the other.”46  
The Manifesto of the Irish Volunteers was announced and distributed during a public 
meeting at the Rotunda Rink in Dublin, on November 25, 1913. Hobson reported that around 
15,000 people were in attendance, and that 4,000 enlisted in the Volunteers after the speech 
presentation of the Manifesto by MacNeill.
47
 However, the Irish Times reported that only 4,000 
people in total attended the event, although it was reported that MacNeill’s speech was given 
much applause by those in attendance, and the Volunteers were received well. Regardless of the 
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exact number, Hobson and MacNeill recruited many Irishman to join the Volunteer movement 
that day, and over the next year the organization would continue to grow steadily.  
 
 
Arthur Griffith and the Sinn Fein Party 
 
 Arthur Griffith, who was born in Dublin in 1872, became one of the most prominent and 
outspoken Irish Nationalists in the early 20
th
 century. Griffith was a prolific writer, and published 
nationalist treatises in various papers, pamphlets, and books. In 1900, he founded the Cumann na 
nGaelheal, which roughly translates into “the League of Gaels.”48 Five years later, the Cumann 
na nGaelheal merged with a few other nationalist organizations and Sinn Fein, which translates 
to either “We Ourselves” or “Ourselves Alone,” was established. 49 Although Griffith was not 
the first president of Sinn Fein (that honor belonging to Edward Martyn)
50
 he was one of its most 
prominent members, especially after his book published in 1904, The Resurrection of Hungry, 
became influential among Irish nationalists.  In The Resurrection of Hungry Griffith argued that 
Hungary had regained its self-determination by refusing to send its members of Parliament to 
Vienna (where the seat of power for the Austrian Empire was) and argued for Ireland to do the 
same.
51
 Griffith was extremely critical of British imperialism, and in a later publication argued 
that “the Kingdom is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, but the Empire is not the 
Empire of Great Britain and Ireland. It is the British Empire.” Griffith continued that “the 
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acceptance of the British Empire is the acceptance of English ascendency,” and was fiercely 
critical of those Irishmen who felt pride in belonging to the British Empire.
52
 
 Sinn Fein, as a political party, preached a doctrine of self-reliance (in keeping with its 
name) and believed that measures should be taken to ensure Ireland could survive independent of 
the British Empire. Griffith believed that the British intentionally inhibited the growth of Irish 
industry in order to quell any potential competition to English manufacturers, 
53
 and even 
referred to the Great Famine of the 1840’s as an “artificial famine” induced by the British.54 In 
his pamphlet, “When the Government Publishes Sedition,” Griffith argued against British 
Military recruitment in Ireland, and expressed that:  
England having destroyed our constitution, suppressed our parliament, loaded her 
debt on our shoulders, ruined our trade and commerce, turned our tillage-fields 
into cattle-ranches, trebled our taxation and halved our population – all within a 
century, wants what is left of us to fight for her supremacy over the world. 
55
 
In general, the official policy of Sinn Fein was to work for the “re-establishment of Ireland’s 
sovereign independence,” by advocating for “passive resistance to English law in Ireland.”56 
Sinn Fein did not openly call for violence or armed rebellion against the British Government, and 
Griffith would even refuse to publish material that openly called for violence to be used against 
the British.
57
 However, Sinn Fein supported the Irish Volunteers, and was certainly not opposed 
to the idea of a rebellion,
58
 even though they technically had no affiliation with either the I.R.B. 
or the Volunteers.  
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 A major part of Sinn Fein’s platform, at least in the years preceding the 1916 Easter 
Rising, was to fight for the establishment of bodies that would allow for Ireland’s economic 
independence from England. The Constitution of Sinn Fein ratified in October of 1917 declared 
that a the major goals of Sinn Fein would be to reestablish an Irish Mercantile Marine and 
national stock exchange, survey the country for minerals or resources that could be mined, 
promote commerce within the country and between Ireland and the European states, and reform 
the educational system to make the teaching of the Irish language and Irish history compulsory.
59
 
Furthermore, Sinn Fein was also a proponent of ensuring workers were paid “a living wage” and 
required that “the equality of men and women in [Sinn Fein] should be emphasized in all 
speeches and leaflets.”60 
 Even though Sinn Fein wanted independence from England and self-reliance for the Irish 
people, Griffith and other leading members of Sinn Fein were fiercely opposed to the Home Rule 
Bill. The Home Rule Bill would not allow an Irish Parliament to control its own independent 
military force and would allow the British Parliament in Westminster to continue its taxation of 
Ireland. In fact, under the proposed Home Rule Bill, the Irish Parliament would have little 
control over its own budget. This was one of Griffith’s main arguments against it, and he even 
wrote that:  
If the Bill be amended to give Ireland real control of her soil and taxes and power 
of finality in her legislation, I shall welcome its passage as a measure for the 
improvement of conditions in Ireland and a step towards clearing the way to a 
final settlement between the two nations.
61
 
However, despite Sinn Fein and Griffith’s notoriety within the Republican movement, in the 
early years of its founding and period before the Easter Rising, Sinn Fein did not have a very 
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large membership or widespread influence. Some members of the I.R.B. or Volunteers were also 
members of Sinn Fein, but overall the I.R.B. Supreme Council had a much larger hand in guiding 
national events than either Griffith or Sinn Fein.  
 
The Cumann na mBan 
 
 The Cumann na mBan, or Irish Woman’s Council, was founded in early 1914, on the 
bequest of Eoin MacNeill, who first proposed the formation of a woman’s organization in during 
his speech at the Rotunda. Like the Volunteers themselves, the founding meeting of the Cumann 
na mBan was held at Wynn’s Hotel in Dublin. During his speech, MacNeill called upon Irish 
women to form an organization to support the men of the Irish Volunteers. MacNeill’s wife, 
Agnes, took a leading role in the establishment of the Cumman na mBan and was present at the 
founding meeting, along with O’Rahilly’s sister, Aine, and a few other notables.62 The objects of 
the Cumann na mBan as established in the first meeting were:  
(1) to advance the cause of Irish Liberty (2) to organize Irish women in 
furtherance of this object (3) to assist in arming and equipping a body of Irishmen 
for the defense of Ireland and (4) to form a fund for these purposes to be called 
the Defense of Ireland Fund.
63
 
Women involved in the Cumann na mBan were also taught practical skills such as first aid,
64
 and 
actively worked to help supply the Irish Volunteers with uniforms and equipment. Sorcha Nic 
Diarmada, a member of a London based chapter of the Cumnn na mBan, wrote that for her 
branch the “chief purpose was to provide arms and also, of course, to collect money for the 
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purchase of arms” which was then sent to Ireland.65 Many women involved in the Cuman na 
mBan were also active in smuggling arms for the Irish Volunteers. Aine O’Rahilly described that 
on one occasion, the women of her chapter formed an orchestra so they could hide weapons in 
instrument cases and escape the watchful eyes of the D.M.P who were engaged in surveillance of 
O’Rahilly’s home.66 Other members of the Cumann na mBan colluded with priests, and hid 
weapons in confessional offering boxes.
67
 
 Unlike the women’s section of the Irish Citizen Army, a separate paramilitary 
organization founded by Joseph Connolly, the Cumann na mBan was an entirely separate (and 
arguably subservient) organization from the Irish Volunteers, and women from the Cumann na 
mBan did not take part in drills, marches, or fighting.
68
  Their contribution to the Irish Volunteers 
was quite significant, however, and after the Easter Rising the Cumann na mBan would continue 
to help support the Irish Republican Army by carrying messages, collecting intelligence, and 
obtaining arms, just as they did in the years before the Rising.  
 Together, with organizations like the Cumman na mBan, Gaelic League, and Sinn Fein, 
the Irish Volunteers were gaining popularity, strength, and momentum. As the situation 
progressed, the priorities of the Volunteers became focused on arming, training, and recruiting. 
Openly, this was to ensure that the Volunteers would be able to defend the Irish people from any 
external or internal threat (i.e. the Ulster Volunteers). However, in reality, those within the I.R.B. 
were already preparing for the possibility of an armed insurrection against the British, for which 
a strong and well-armed force would be needed.  
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2. Ireland Armed 
Introduction  
 
 The years between the formation of the Irish Volunteers and the Easter Rising were 
tumultuous, and characterized by a sense of uncertainty among both Irish Nationalists and 
Unionists. England entered the First World War in 1914, the passage of a Home Rule bill seemed 
dubious, and Irish Nationalists continued to view the Ulster Volunteer Force as an imminent 
threat. However, despite the tense nature of this period relatively little open violence broke out 
until the Easter Rising of April 24, 1916. Instead, the years between 1913 and 1916 were filled 
with armament, training, recruitment, and organization – all of which were devastated by the 
split in the Volunteers that took place after John Redmond’s infamous speech at Woodenbridge, 
in September of 1914.  
 
The Acquisition of Arms 
 
 Patrick Henry Pearse once wrote that “Ireland unarmed will attain just as much freedom 
as it is convenient for England to give her; Ireland armed will attain ultimately just as much 
freedom as she wants.”69 Soon after the establishment of the Irish Volunteers, the procurement of 
weapons became the major objective of both the I.R.B. and the Volunteers. As Bulmer Hobson 
wrote some years later, “when the Volunteers were started in 1913 we very rapidly got an 
enormous number of members, variously estimated to be between 100,000 and 150,000.”70 
However Hobson adds that “while we had this vast membership, we had very little funds and 
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virtually no arms.”71 Although some Irish households owned shotguns, modern rifles and 
revolvers were scarce. Officers in the R.I.C. and members of the British Military were equipped 
with rifles and revolvers, and easily outgunned any company of Irish Volunteers. O’Rahilly 
stressed that “every Volunteer […] must be armed, and armed immediately,”72 and many 
veterans of the I.R.B. and the Irish Volunteers described how members paid a “subscription for 
the purchase of arms” upon joining either organization.73 Other nationalist organizations, like the 
U.S. based Clan na Gael and Fianna Éireann, also supported the Volunteers, and donations for 
the purpose of purchasing arms were frequently collected from Republican or Nationalist 
supporters.
74
  Until arms could be procured, some groups of Volunteers drilled with sticks in the 
place of rifles,
75
 or carried batons rather than firearms during marches and demonstrations.
76
 
It was often the case that prior to the Easter Rising, entire columns of Volunteers would 
have only two or three rifles, making them extremely valuable resources.
77
  Desmond Fitzgerald, 
who founded of a Kerry company of Irish Volunteers, wrote in his memoir that, “men with rifles 
were a novelty,” and that people were quite surprised to see a group of Volunteers armed with 
rifles.
78
 Revolvers were also a sought after commodity, since as one member of both the I.R.B 
and Irish Volunteers noted it was “understood that [their] work in the case of a rising would be 
sabotage of transport, communication, docks, etc, etc,” 79 and revolvers were well suited to that 
type of close quarters urban combat.  
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  Most units of Irish Volunteers had a quartermaster in charge of caring for, distributing, 
and hiding, the weapons collected by the Volunteer Company. Patrick Clifford, the quartermaster 
of one Mitchelston company of Volunteers described how he hid arms from the authorities:  
A suitable wooden box was prepared, painted, greased, ect. and was built into the 
fence. The open end of the box was practically in line with the edge of the fence 
at a gap – the opening being closed by a stone of suitable size. The gap was then 
blocked with Whitethorn bushes ect. which could be replaced after anything had 
been removed from or replaced in the dump and would obliterate all makes made 
by anyone working in the vicinity.
80
  
 
Since most of the money raised by the Volunteers went to the purchase of arms and ammunition, 
the loss of arms could be devastating and hard to replace, since the British tried to prevent any 
arms from being brought into the country.  
 Great lengths were taken to smuggle arms into the country for the Volunteers. Bulmer 
Hobson wrote in detail about efforts to import arms into Ireland in 1914, describing how Sir 
Roger Casement, a former British consular official who actively supported the Irish Volunteers, 
developed a strategy in which he would collect money from wealthy “subscribers” to buy 
weapons in Antwerp, and then “bring them to Ireland, sell the arms to the Irish Volunteers and 
reimburse the subscribers.”81 The most famous arms landing in the history of the Volunteers 
occurred at Howth, a small peninsula directly above the city of Dublin. For the Howth landing, 
which took place on July 26, 1914, Darrell Figgis purchased 1500 old Mauser rifles from the 
Franco-Prussian War and 45,000 rounds of ammunition for £1500, which were then transferred 
to the Yachts of Erskine Childers and Conor O’Brien. O’Brien failed to get his yacht passed the 
patrols of the British Navy, but Childers managed to successfully get 900 of the rifles to Howth.  
To avoid detection by the British forces, for weeks prior the Volunteers held marches 
along different routes making it appear that their marches were routine training exercises. At first 
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the R.I.C. kept careful watch over the marches, but eventually allowed them to go on unhindered 
when they appeared to be benign.
82
 When scouting Howth as a possible site for the landing, 
O’Rahilly even brought his children with him, in order to make it look as if he was simply taking 
a day trip with his family. According to his sister Aine, O’Rahilly “made the children play hide 
and seek near the coastguard station and in that way got into a conversation with the 
coastguards,” which he used to determine the best method of smuggling in the rifles.83 On the 
morning the yacht arrived at Howth, Cathal Brugha was sent to secure the port ahead of time 
with 20 I.R.B. men who “were each instructed to invite a lady friend out for the day.”84 Hobson 
describes that:  
They were to go by taxi to Howth and order lunch at the hotel, keeping a close 
watch on the harbor. When they saw the yacht coming in they were to abandon 
both the ladies and the lunch and bring their taxis up the harbor ready to carry 
their appointed loads to their appointed destination.
85
  
 
Despite the careful planning of Hobson and the leadership, on the trip back from Howth the 
Volunteers were confronted by both the R.I.C. and British military. To illustrate the tense nature 
of the time, the Volunteers were marching with their newly acquired rifles unloaded, but upon 
reaching the British forces blocking the road “a number of the Volunteers made repeated 
attempts to rush the Fianna trek carts to get some ammunition with which to fire at the police.”86 
However, this was prevented by the Fianna, who were purposefully entrusted with the 
ammunition so the Volunteers would not have the option to engage the R.I.C. or British military 
personnel. Fortunately each side refrained from opening fire, and as the officer in charge of the 
R.I.C. and military was being distracted the Volunteers in the rear of the column managed to slip 
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away. Although 19 rifles were confiscated from those near the front, both sides walked away 
without any casualties, and Howth became the most successful landing of weapons in the history 
of the Volunteers.
87
 The meticulous planning done by Hobson and the leadership of the Irish 
Volunteers was the key to the success of missions like the landing at Howth, and great lengths 
were taken to lead the British Military and R.I.C. astray.  
 
  
Recruitment, Propaganda, and Training  
 
 Although the acquisition of arms was a major focus of the Irish Volunteers in the years 
preceding the Easter Rising, recruitment and training were also highly emphasized. Many who 
joined the Irish Volunteers were relatively young and often had a previous connection to some 
sort of Republican or Nationalist movement. Like the I.R.B., the Irish Volunteers absorbed 
recruits from the Fianna, G.A.A., and the Gaelic League. The I.R.B. itself played a significant 
role in recruitment for the Irish Volunteers, since its members were instructed to join companies 
of Irish Volunteers and encouraged to gain a hold of leadership positions.
88
 Although not every 
Volunteer was a member of the I.R.B., nearly every member of the I.R.B. was a Volunteer.   
Furthermore, The Irish Volunteer (or Óglaigh na hÉireann) would publish articles with the aim 
of attracting new recruits to join the Volunteers. Bulmer Hobson stated in a 1915 report that The 
Irish Volunteer had “been most valuable as a propagandist organ throughout the year.”89 The 
first issue of The Irish Volunteer was published in February of 1914, and the newspaper 
remained in publication until the Easter Rising. In 1918, a new paper titled An t-Óglác came into 
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publication and filled the void left by The Irish Volunteer, becoming the primary publication of 
the Irish Republican Army.
90
 
The propaganda published in periodicals like The Irish Volunteer was often aimed at 
inciting fear in the Irish people and painting images of British tyranny, while simultaneously 
painting the Irish Volunteers as the saviors of Irish Liberty and Freedom. In one article aimed at 
attracting potential recruits to join the Volunteers, Patrick Henry Pearse wrote that “we want 
recruits because we are sure of the rightness of our cause.”91 Pearse then elaborates that:  
What if Conscription be forced upon Ireland? What if a Unionist or a Coalition 
British Ministry repudiates the Home Rule Act? What if it be determined to 
dismember Ireland? What if it be attempted to disarm Ireland? The future is big 
with these and other possibilities. And these are among the reasons we want 
recruits.
92
  
 
These were all very real concerns for average Irish people, and the idea of conscription 
into the British Military frightened many Irishman once World War I broke out. 
Recruitment posters were also issued, with messages like “the Irish Volunteers are 
trained and armed to fight IN Ireland to secure and maintain the rights and liberties 
common to all the people of Ireland.”93 
 Although The Irish Volunteer was the primary organ of propaganda for the 
Volunteers before the Easter Rising, other nationalist organizations had their own 
publications. The official publication of the Gaelic League was An Claidheamh Soluis, 
and was established by Eoin MacNeill.
94
 The Secret History of the Irish Volunteers was 
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written by O’Rahilly, and was published in Dublin in 1915.95 In the years leading up to 
the rising “recruiting literature, window cards, etc.,” were distributed by “recruiting 
bodies” established by the Irish Volunteers as a way of attracting more men to enroll in 
their local company of Volunteers.
96
  
 Since it was known that associating with the Irish Volunteers could be potentially 
hazardous, a “Defense of Ireland Fund” was established by the Central Executive and 
General Council as a “mutual insurance society” in order to help support members of the 
Volunteers and their families in the event they lost their means to support themselves, 
specifically for those who “were imprisoned or lost their employment on account of their 
connection with the Irish Volunteers.”97 Policies like the Defense of Ireland Fund likely 
helped encourage recruitment as well, since it provided security for potential recruits who 
had a family.
98
 A report of this program published in The Irish Volunteer reported that “a 
large number of Volunteers” had paid into the Defense Fund, but the exact number of 
those who took advantage of the program is unclear.  
 After the failed Easter Rising, the amount of propaganda distributed by both the 
Irish Volunteers and the Daíl Éireann
99
 increased dramatically. Aine Ceannt, the widow 
of Eamon Ceannt (who was executed for his role in the Rising), wrote that “during the 
fight for independence after 1916, which culminated in the Truce in 1921, propaganda 
was one of the strongest weapons used by the Dáil Éireann.”100 During this time (the 
period of 1919-1921) there were many different ministers of propaganda for the Dáil, 
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including Erskine Childers and Desmond Fitzgerald, since members of the Dáil were 
often arrested by the British Military or R.I.C. However, during this time the Dáil 
managed to distribute propaganda throughout Ireland and in various countries such as 
Spain, Italy, and France, who were “sent copies of the ‘Irish Bulletin’ and other 
pamphlets.”101 A strong emphasis was put on Irish nationalism in these pamphlets, and 
Aine Ceannt added that “in 1921 there was also established Cumann Léigheact an 
Phobail, which was a committee set up to compile booklets on various subjects for 
distribution to the Sinn Fein Clubs,” that were often published in both English and 
Irish.
102
  
Although the Fianna Éireann was established not only “to promote the study of 
Irish Language and to make boys sound nationally,” but also “to re-establish the 
Independence of Ireland” by means of “the training of the youth of Ireland, mentally and 
physically […] by teaching, scouting, and military exercises,” 103 many new members of 
the Volunteers had little military experience or training. Therefore, most groups of 
Volunteers had at least one or two drills a week, where the members of the company 
would meet, discuss tactics, and train.
104
 In many cases Irish veterans of the British Army 
were recruited to train the Volunteers,
105
 and the company was expected to “follow 
exactly the drill set out in the British Infantry Manual, 1911.”106 However, although the 
Volunteers would bring former soldiers to train the Volunteers, many of these ex-soldiers 
were often looked upon with deep suspicion, and were typically not accepted into the 
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ranks of the Irish Volunteers themselves. During training, a wide variety of tactics were 
discussed. As one former volunteer described:  
We had lectures from Pearse on street fighting and barricading of the streets, 
lanes, ect. We were told not to man the barricades physically, but to cover them 
from the nearby houses. We also got instruction on boring, in a zig zag manner, 
from house to house.
107
   
 
Long before the Easter Rising, the leaders of the Volunteers understood that this rebellion would 
not be fought on a traditional battlefield, but rather in the streets of Dublin itself.  
Instructors also had the Volunteers practice marching, and trained them in the use of 
firearms, most new Volunteers had no experience firing a rifle (since at most, their family may 
have owned a shotgun for hunting). However, ammunition was a luxury in this period, and in 
order to save ammunition men continued to drill with fake rifles even after real rifles were 
obtained.
108
 The leadership of the Irish Volunteers also established training camps held during 
the summer months at various locations around the country in 1915 (held in Co. Tyrone in July, 
in Wicklow and North Co. Cork in August, and in Co. Galway in September). According to 
reports approximately 200 men attended these camps which provided a more intensive training 
than the normal drills with the local Volunteer companies.
109
 As for any militia, state sponsored 
or otherwise, both training and discipline are crucial to their effectiveness, and the leaders of the 
Irish Volunteers put much effort into ensuring the men were ready to take up arms to defend the 
Irish nation and people.   
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Organization of the Irish Volunteer Company Before 1916 
 
The headquarters of the Irish Volunteers issued regulations that all companies were 
required to adhere to.  Although the officers in each company of Irish Volunteers were usually 
elected by the men,
110
 the officers still had to answer to the Central Executive and the General 
Council, and could not give any orders that countermanded either the constitution of the Irish 
Volunteers or those on the Central Executive.
111
 Since the various Volunteer companies were 
spread out across the entire country, communication with the leadership at the headquarters in 
Dublin was an important concern,
112
 and curriers frequently carried instructions from Dublin out 
to Volunteer companies across the country. 
  Companies were also instructed to be as inclusive as possible for anyone interested in 
joining, in order to “combat any idea that the Volunteers are to enable any one section of 
Irishmen to secure a political advantage over any other section.”113 The Central Executive 
wanted to paint the Ulster Volunteers as the separatists who cared little for inclusion, and 
certainly did not want to see the conflict become sectarian that it would undermine their claim to 
legitimacy which stemmed from their embrace of nationalism and desire to attain Irish liberty. 
However, the Irish Volunteers remained closely associated with both the I.R.B. and Sinn Fein 
(and remained predominantly Catholic), despite the efforts to maintain neutrality and become 
repetitive of the Irish population as a whole. 
Like any military organization, the Irish Volunteers were organized in a specific fashion. 
Ideally, a company of Volunteers was to be divided into four sections, with each section 
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consisting of two squads. The squad was “to be composed of eight men”, so the ideal company 
was to consist of roughly 64 men led by 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 4 Sergeants, and 8 
corporals.
114
 Although this was how the leadership of the Irish Volunteers wished each company 
to look like, there was a wide range of company sizes, and many companies of Irish Volunteers 
had fewer than the full complement of 64. Thomas Barry, Captain of a Cork Company of 
Volunteers wrote that at the time of the Easter Rising his company consisted of only 18 men.
115
 
However, another Captain wrote that prior to the Rising he estimated that both the Tullamore 
Company and Athlone Company each had around 100 men,
116
 so the sizes of each Company 
varied quite a bit. 
 
The Split in the Volunteers  
 
 The controversial speech given by John Redmond at Woodenbridge became one of the 
seminal events that defined the Irish Volunteer movement prior to the Easter Rising. John 
Redmond, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary party, champion of the Home Rule movement, 
and an elected member to the British House of Commons,
117
 became very influential in Ireland 
and was well respected by many Irish Republicans, including those involved with the Irish 
Volunteers. Although Redmond was in favor of working within the British Parliament, he was 
certainly no unionist, and appealed to many moderate Irish nationalists. However, Redmond was 
closely associated with the Liberal party in England and had respect for the British Government. 
When World War I broke out, Redmond encouraged Irishmen to join the British Military, and 
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argued that to safeguard Ireland; the people must also fight for the survival of the United 
Kingdom. In his speech at Woodenbridge in September of 1914, Redmond called upon the Irish 
Volunteers to join the British armed forces and fight abroad to aid the allies during the war. This 
request from Redmond countermanded the ideas and commands of Hobson, O’Rahilly, and 
MacNeill (as well as the other I.R.B. members in the Central Executive of the Volunteers) who 
believed true nationalists should ignore England’s call for soldiers. Despite the Central 
Executive’s position, many members of the Irish Volunteers felt that supporting England in the 
war was the path to finally gaining autonomy, since discussion of the Home Rule bill had been 
suspended until after the war. However by this point in time those within the I.R.B., as well as 
others who followed MacNeill and Griffith, believed that Home Rule was destined to fail 
regardless, and believed that England’s success in the war would only enable them to continue 
oppressing the Irish people. A schism was inevitable, the Volunteer movement split between 
those supporting Redmond and those supporting Hobson and MacNeill. Eventually a large group 
supporting Redmond broke off from the Irish Volunteers and formed their own organization, 
known as the National Volunteers.
118
 
The split was devastating to the original Volunteer force, and as Pedar Bracken, a Captain 
in the Volunteers described “the committee, by a small majority, decided to stand by the old 
Executive, but the greater portion of the Volunteers followed Redmond.”119 Mathew Finucane, 
of member of the Irish Volunteers in Kerry wrote that the split affected his company so 
drastically it completely fell apart, and was not reorganized until 1916.
120
 In many companies 
membership plummeted, and Hobson estimated that only somewhere between two and three 
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thousand men remained with the Irish Volunteers right after the split (though their strength 
gradually increased again until the 1916 Rising).
121
 Some companies had to resort to creative 
methods of recruitment, and Oscar Traynor, a member of a Dublin company of the Volunteers, 
described that in his Company the Volunteer who recruited the most people after the split was 
awarded a revolver.
122
 Although the split certainly hurt the Irish Volunteers, those that did 
remain were often those also associated with the I.R.B., or those who were more openly hostile 
to British hegemony in Ireland. It would go too far to say that the split radicalized the 
Volunteers, but it likely made it easier for those in the I.R.B. to push the Volunteers toward open 
rebellion. 
Although many of the Volunteers supported Redmond, the National Volunteers never 
reached the same level of organization or cohesion as the Irish Volunteers. John Southwell wrote 
that:  
A number of the National Volunteers were reservists in the British Army and 
were called for active service. A number of others volunteered their service for 
the Army. The organization of the National Volunteers, after this happened, to 
some extent broke down. There was little enthusiasm among the rank and file who 
remained, as many of them did not feel any great urge to take a personal part in 
England's war.
123
 
 
Desmond Fitzgerald, who was openly hostile to Redmond, concurred with Southwell in his 
memoir writing that before long the National Volunteers “felt they were no longer part of a great 
national movement” and gradually dissolved.124 However, by Fitzgerald’s own admission there 
were some incredibly fervent Redmond supporters during the split, who assaulted Fitzgerald 
verbally and physically accusing those remaining loyal to Sinn Fein and the Irish Volunteers of 
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being traitors and in the pocket of the Kaiser.
125
 It would later be revealed that the latter insult 
was not entirely inaccurate, as Roger Casement and some members of the I.R.B. began 
negotiating with the Germans. Overall, the split was incredibly divisive, and there were 
dedicated supporters on both sides. Many who remained loyal to the Irish Volunteers, especially 
those in the leadership, viewed Redmond as a traitor to the Irish people. For these people, 
Redmond’s policy delegitimized the Irish Parliamentary party. Seán T. O’Kelly, who was active 
in both the I.R.B. and Irish Volunteers (and would eventually become President of the Republic 
of Ireland), wrote that: 
Redmond’s statement of policy, which was as far as we knew accepted 
unanimously by the Irish Parlimentary Party, cleared the air as far as we were 
concerned. We knew now exactly where we stood and the heavy responsibilities 
that lay with us.
126
  
 
Redmond’s actions at Woodenbridge likely served as another catalyst for the Easter Rising, since 
those in the leadership of the both the Irish Volunteers and I.R.B. lost all faith in the Irish 
Parliamentary Party, and felt that it was up to them to launch a rebellion. Although the initial 
schism was damaging to the Irish Volunteers, in the years following the split the Irish Volunteers 
once again became the prominent organization, with the National Volunteers disappearing 
almost completely after the Easter Rising. 
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3. Ireland’s August Destiny 
Planning the Rising  
 
 The Easter Rising of 1916 was not planned by the Executive Committee of the Irish 
Volunteers or the I.R.B. Supreme Council. Although the Supreme Council did decide to carry 
out an insurrection against the British (which had always been the ultimate goal of the I.R.B.) it 
never determined when this insurrection would be, and those who planned the Rising never 
informed the Supreme Council of any details.
127
 As Denis McCullough described, the Rising was 
“organized and planned by the Military Council set up by the Supreme Council [of the 
I.R.B.].”128 It is likely that Sean MacDermott and Joseph Plunkett were the instigators of plot, 
but the other members of the special Military Council included Thomas MacDonagh, James 
Connolly, Eamonn Ceannt, Patrick Henry Pearse, and Thomas Clarke.
129
 Although the 
conspirators planned for a Rising without the express knowledge of either the I.R.B. Supreme 
Council or Central Executive of the Irish Volunteers, they were all closely affiliated with the two 
organizations. At the time MacDonagh, Ceannt, and Pearse, served on the Central Executive of 
the Volunteers, and MacDermott and Clarke served on the Executive of the I.R.B. Supreme 
Council as its secretary and treasurer, respectively.  
 The split in the Volunteer movement caused by Redmond had lasting impacts on the 
leadership of both the Volunteers who remained loyal to the Central Executive and the I.R.B. 
Bulmer Hobson, who had supported Redmond’s effort to place some of his own supporters in 
leadership positions of the Irish Volunteers, “resigned from the Supreme Council [of the I.R.B.] 
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because of the bitterness of Tom Clarke particularly and of Sean MacDermott.”130 According to 
Denis McCullough:  
Tom Clarke, who was a man of a very simple mind, loved and admired Hobson 
immensely. Consequently, when Hobson was guilty of what Tom considered a 
betrayal, the rift was very bitter and Tom would not forgive him or trust him 
again.
131
  
Hobson’s departure from the I.R.B. Supreme Council served to further remove him from any 
plans the Military Council made, and alienated him from the orchestrators of the Rising. After 
the Rising Hobson was extremely critical of those on the I.R.B. Military Council, writing: 
MacDermott and Pearse, and those who thought with them, finding it utterly 
impossible to persuade the Volunteer Executive to abandon this system for their 
policy of an insurrectionary demonstration, entered into a secret agreement with 
Connolly to bring the Volunteers out in an insurrection unprepared and unaware 
of what they were being let in for.
132
  
 
Hobson also referred to those on the Military Council as a “junta,” and charged them with 
ignoring the constitution of the I.R.B. that was amended after the failed rebellion of 1867. 
According to Hobson the constitution stated that “the I.R.B. shall await the decision of the Irish 
Nation as expressed by a majority of the Irish people as to the fit hour of inaugurating a war 
against England.”133 Even on the eve of the Rising, there was a fierce division within the 
Republican movement as to whether or not it was the correct time to stage an insurrection.  
Many Irish Republicans, including Bulmer Hobson, Eoin MacNeill, and Desmond 
Fitzgerald, hoped to win the support of the Germans, and did not believe an insurrection against 
the British would succeed without either German arms or a German invasion force. FitzGerald 
wrote that before the Rising “we had taken it for granted that we should be co-operating with a 
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great power whose forces and equipment would be brought to Ireland.”134 Joseph O’Rourke, the 
Center of one Dublin Circle of the I.R.B., expressed similar sentiments, and said that the I.R.B. 
was anticipating that the Germans would be able to supply them with modern weapons by the 
mid-summer of 1916.
135
 Roger Casement, who had embarked on a mission to gather funds and 
support for the Volunteers in the United States, worked closely with John Devoy, the leader of 
the Clan na Gael (a U.S. based Irish separatist organization affiliated with the I.R.B.). Devoy, 
who saw the outbreak of WWI shortly after Casement’s arrival in New York as a great 
opportunity, immediately contacted the German Ambassador in Washington, Count 
Bernstorff.
136
 With both Devoy and Bernstorff’s encouragement, Casement decided to travel 
from the United States to Berlin and seek German support for an Irish insurrection.
137
 
Casement arrived in Germany on October 31,
, 
1915, and immediately entered into 
negotiations with the German foreign ministry.
138
 However, it seems the leadership (at least 
within the I.R.B.) had little faith in Casement’s ability,139 and Joseph Plunkett arrived to Berlin 
in early 1916. Together he and Casement continued to press a somewhat reluctant German 
Foreign Ministry for aid. Casement and Plunkett pitched a detailed plan for a German invasion of 
the west coast of Ireland, and requested 12,000 German soldiers bring with them 40,000 modern 
rifles. They hoped that if the Germans took the city of Limerick and sufficiently armed the local 
Volunteer companies, they could establish a large defendable foothold within Ireland.
140
 
However, over time it became apparent that the German government had no real intention of 
sending troops, since it would be extremely difficult and risky for an invasion force of that 
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magnitude to pass through British controlled waters,
141
 and they likely felt the risk would not be 
worth the reward. Despite their unwillingness to send soldiers to Ireland, the German 
Government did pledge Plunkett 20,000 rifles and ammunition, which the Volunteers could use 
themselves. Although there are conflicting reports of Casement’s attitude, it appears that he 
believed weapons alone would not be sufficient enough to carry out a rising, and thought that 
without German troops supporting the Volunteers any insurrection would fail. In contrast, 
Plunkett (and likely the other members of the Military Council) believed they could still carry 
out a Rising with German arms alone.
142
 Apparently, in a last minute attempt to stop the planned 
Rising, or at least with the desire to be in Ireland while it was carried out, Casement convinced 
the German government to give him and two others passage on a U-boat back to Ireland. 
Although the U-boat arrived off the coast of Ireland safely, early on the morning of Good Friday 
1916 Casement landed ashore in Co. Galway, but was quickly apprehended by members of the 
R.I.C. and placed under arrest.  
 Unfortunately, the Germans had decided to load all 20,000 rifles and the ammunition 
they had pledged aboard a captured Swedish ship called the Aud.
143
  While the Aud set sail, there 
was a massive failure of communication between the Irish Volunteers and the German Foreign 
Ministry, and when the Aud arrived off the coast of Ireland late in the evening on Holy Thursday, 
there were no Volunteers present to unload the massive shipment of arms. While the Aud was 
awaiting contact with the Volunteers, it was discovered by the British Navy early on the morning 
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of Good Friday, and the German captain was forced to scuttle the ship, destroying it along with 
all the arms and ammunition.
144
  
The weekend before the Rising was extremely chaotic, and saw a major conflict erupt 
between Hobson and MacNeill, and the rest of the I.R.B. Military Council.  Late in the evening 
on Holy Thursday, two associates of Hobson came into his office and informed him that an 
insurrection was set to take place on Easter Sunday.
145
 Upon hearing this news, Hobson went 
immediately to MacNeill’s house and woke him. The two then went to Pearse’s house in the 
middle of the night to confront him. According to Hobson (who admittedly had a very negative 
view of Pearse), Pearse admitted to the pair that the Rising was set to begin Easter Sunday, and 
ensured them they were powerless to prevent it.
146
 Whether or not Pearse’s attitude was as 
confrontational as Hobson described, previously that day Pearse had issued orders to the Dublin 
Brigade of the Irish Volunteers ordering them to "mobilize Easter Sunday at the hour of 2.45 
p.m."
147
 By the time Hobson and MacNeill confronted him, it seems Pearse and the others were 
absolutely intent on carrying out the Rising.  
The series of events that followed Hobson and MacNeill’s discovery of the plans for a 
Rising are quite convoluted. It appears that initially MacNeill decided against interfering in the 
plans of the I.R.B. Military Council. However, once MacNeill was informed of the arrest of 
Roger Casement, he issued orders to the Volunteer companies to call off “the Sunday 
maneuvers” which were merely a front for the Easter Rising.148 MacNeill sent O’Rahilly and 
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others out as couriers on Sunday morning, with orders countermanding the rising.
149
 He also 
drafted a statement late Saturday night, which appeared in the Sunday Independent, stating:  
Owing to the very critical position all orders given to the Irish Volunteers for 
tomorrow, Easter Sunday, are hereby rescinded, and no parades, marches, or other 
movements of the Irish Volunteers will take place. Each individual Volunteer will 
obey this order strictly in every particular.
150
  
Once MacNeill issued these orders the leadership of the I.R.B. was enraged, and at a meeting late 
Sunday evening in MacNeill’s house MacDonagh got into a heated discussion with MacNeill.151 
Sean O’Kelly, who was present at the time, wrote that: 
McDonagh then, in my hearing, said to him that he, MacNeill, had full knowledge 
of all that was intended to take place that week and that he had accepted and 
agreed to the arrangements that had been made, and that in his opinion this was no 
time, at this late hour to start upsetting what had been agreed to and arranged.
152
  
 
MacDonagh apparently went on to state that the Volunteers would carry out the Rising despite 
the counter orders given by MacNeill, and informed him that Pearse had more influence with the 
Volunteers than MacNeill, and could lead them if need be. MacNeill later asked O’Kelly if he 
thought that was true, and O’Kelly responded that he “felt certain that the Volunteers of the city, 
those of them who were members of the I.R.B. or under I.R.B. influence would accept Pearse’s 
orders.”153 Eamonn Ceannt was also infuriated with MacNeill, and went so far as to remark that 
“if he had full authority MacNeill should be shot.”154 
Meanwhile, Bulmer Hobson, who like MacNeill, was opposed to the idea of an armed 
insurrection, had been arrested and kidnapped on the morning of Good Friday by members of the 
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I.R.B. under orders from the I.R.B. Military Council, ensuring he would not attempt to intervene 
in their plans.
155
 Upon learning this, O’Rahilly was reportedly furious, and even drew a weapon 
on Pearse when he confronted him on the matter.
156
 However, the extent to which Hobson, 
MacNeill, and O’Rahilly were aware of the plans for the rising is unclear. It is seems likely, that 
if the I.R.B. Military Council thought it necessary to place Hobson under arrest, they believed he 
would actively try and prevent the Rising. If that is the case, then it would be logical to assume 
the I.R.B. Military Council believed MacNeill would not interfere, since he was left unmolested 
after confronting Pearse about his plans for the Rising Thursday evening. That, combined with 
MacDonagh’s statement to him Sunday evening (stating MacNeill knew and agreed about the 
Rising) seems to indicate that even if MacNeill really was kept in the dark until Holy Thursday, 
he subsequently agreed not to interfere with the plan.  It is possible MacNeill had a change of 
heart once he learned of Casement’s arrest and the failed attempt to unload weapons from the 
Aud, but MacNeill’s wife asserted that he “knew nothing about the arrangement for the landing 
of German arms in Kerry.”157 If that statement is true, then the news of Casement’s arrest and the 
failed arms landing (which MacNeill received late Saturday) should not have been what pushed 
MacNeill to finally countermand Pearse’s orders. However, it is always possible MacNeill 
agreed to let the Rising occur on Thursday and simply got nervous and changed his mind on 
Saturday.  
Why MacNeill acted when he did, and for what reasons, may never be completely clear, 
but his last minute countermanding orders had a profound effect on the Easter Rising. Late 
Sunday night Pearse sent the following message out to Volunteer Companies across the country: 
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“We start operations at noon today, Monday. Carry out your instructions.”158  Pearse also sent an 
order Monday morning to MacDonagh, the commandant of the 2
nd
 Battalion of the Dublin 
Brigade (and who had overall command of the 4 battalions during the Rising) stating that “the 
four city battalions will parade for inspection and route march at 10.00 a.m. today” and ordered 
them to carry “full arms and equipment and one day’s rations.”159 The Military Council’s plan 
was to establish a defensive perimeter around the center of Dublin and hold it against any British 
incursions, while Volunteer companies all around the country organized and staged revolts.
160
 
However, it was estimated that they would need at least 2,000 Volunteers in Dublin to 
successfully hold the city center and prevent British reinforcements. Due to MacNeill’s last 
minute orders in the Sunday Independent, only 1,000 men took up arms on Easter Monday, 
which meant that not only would it be significantly harder to maintain control over the city 
center, but there would be no feasible way the Volunteers could prevent British reinforcements 
from entering the city.
161
 
 
James Connolly and the Irish Citizen Army 
 
 A discussion of the Easter Rising would be incomplete without mention of the Irish 
Citizen Army and James Connolly, an avid Marxist, labor leader, and Irish Nationalist. The Irish 
Citizen Army (I.C.A.) was originally founded in 1913 as an organization to protect workers on 
strike from “the brutalities of the R.I.C. and the D.M.P. under the direction of Dublin Castle”,162 
and was closely associated with various Irish workers’ unions. Membership in the I.C.A. 
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increased steadily after large strikes broke out in 1913, and there were nearly 1000 members in 
the I.C.A. at its peak. However, in January 1914 many of the union disputes that drove workers 
to join the I.C.A. were resolved, and membership quickly dwindled. Shortly afterward, Connolly 
was appointed Commandant, and quickly turned the I.C.A. into a well-trained and well-
disciplined militia.
163
 
Unlike those in the I.R.B. or Irish Volunteers, Connolly was openly radical – in terms of 
both his political and revolutionary views, and wrote extensively for the publications Worker’s 
Republic and Irish Worker. Connolly’s blend of socialism and nationalism came through in his 
writings, especially when he made statements such as “the Labour movement in Ireland stands 
for ownership of all Ireland by all the Irish.” However, as one of his colleges described that: 
Although Connolly is considered to have been a communist he was primarily an 
Irish Republican, although he was naturally always preoccupied with the idea of 
alleviating the lot of Irish workmen. He often said that the social revolution would 
never come until we had England off our back.
164
 
 As soon as World War I broke out (over a year before the Easter Rising would occur) Connolly 
began advocating for an insurrection, stating that “we have waited and now Germany has come, 
and we will start our own Parliament.”165 Connolly was also convinced that the British would 
resort to conscription early in the war, and was at the forefront of the first anti-conscription 
campaign writing, “we will resist the Militia Ballot Act, or any form of conscription, and we will 
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begin now to prepare our resistance.”166 For Connolly, that resistance meant “barricades in the 
streets, guerrilla warfare in the country.”167 
Connolly’s background as a Union leader likely gave him a different perspective than the 
members of the I.R.B Military Council. Connolly placed far more importance on symbolic 
actions and political statements, and although under his tutelage the I.C.A. became a much better 
trained force than the Irish Volunteers, he believed that even his small force of men (the I.C.A. 
consisted of 219 members at the time of the Easter Rising)
168
 could make a significant impact. In 
one article Connolly wrote that “you [the Irish people] have been told you are not strong, that 
you have no rifles. Revolutions do not start with rifles; start first and get your rifles later.”169 
This mentality was completely different than that of the I.R.B., which focused on careful and 
discrete planning.  As an example of his commitment to symbolic action, during the Easter 
Rising, Connolly planned for his men to take Dublin Castle, and then retreat, merely as a show of 
force and blow to British prestige.
170
 Connolly also concerned himself with training highly 
disciplined and motivated recruits, rather than attempting to swell the ranks of the I.C.A. with 
sheer numbers. When trying to attract recruits to the I.C.A. Connolly wrote that “we want no 
parade ground soldiers. We want young men prepared to die for Freedom in Ireland.”171  
Connolly was a revolutionary through and through. 
The I.C.A. was completely autonomous, and had no direct connection to the I.R.B., Irish 
Volunteers, Sinn Fein, or any other nationalist organization. Connolly actively disliked both 
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Bulmer Hobson and Eoin MacNeill, and reportedly referred to MacNeill’s publication, The Irish 
Volunteer, as “a great wet blanket spread over Ireland every week.” Even though Connolly’s 
forces were relatively small in number, they were deeply loyal, and Connolly was prepared to 
stage an insurrection on his own even if the Irish Volunteers did join. William Oman, one 
member of the I.C.A. that fought with Connolly during the Rising, reported that  
A few weeks prior to the route march [scheduled for Easter Sunday 1916], each 
member of the Citizen Army had been called in before Commandant Connolly 
and Commandant Mallin and asked if he was prepared to act without the 
assistance of the Volunteers.
172
 
Oman and the other members of the I.C.A. were convinced that Connolly meant to take Dublin 
castle on his own, and were prepared to join him even in such a suicidal task. The I.R.B. Military 
Council also believed Connolly might act alone, and became extremely weary of the I.C.A. in 
early 1916. The Council had settled on Easter as the date for their insurrection, and was worried 
that if Connolly rashly launched his own rebellion before the Volunteers had a chance to stage 
their own, they would lose the element of surprise for the Easter Rising and risk a stronger 
British presence in Dublin. On January 19, 1916, Connolly disappeared.  Commandant Mallin, 
Connolly’s second in command, was convinced that the I.R.B. had kidnapped him, but others in 
the I.C.A. thought he had been taken by the British.
173
 Although the details of Connolly’s 
disappearance never came to light (and he reappeared after a short time), it is likely he 
voluntarily attended a meeting with the Military Council of the I.R.B., who decided it was safer 
to include Connolly in the plan to stage a Rising on Easter Sunday than leave him to his own 
revolutionary devices.
174
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Although the I.C.A. was small, they played a very important part in the Rising due to 
their strict discipline and superior military training. In preparations for the Rising ammunition 
and explosives were produced at Liberty Hall in Dublin, the headquarters of the I.C.A.
175
 The 
female members of the I.C.A. were also given first aid training for the 6 months leading up to the 
Rising, in order to prepare them to act as nurses and care for the wounded.
176
 However, women 
were treated fairly equally within the I.C.A., and were also given arms and allowed to take part 
in the fighting if they chose (unlike women in the Cumann na mBan, who were relegated 
specifically to support positions).
177
 Preparations for the Rising were taken very seriously, and as 
one member of the I.C.A. described, “at least a week before the Rising we were terribly busy 
making up knapsacks for the men and also first aid kits, as we had to have so many ready.”178 
Women also began preparing rations for the men as early as Holy Thursday.
179
 
Furthermore, although scholars often credit Joseph Plunkett with coming up with the 
rebel’s military strategy for the Easer Rising, Connolly likely played an important role in the 
planning as well. As far back as July of 1915 Connolly developed strategies for urban combat, 
and even wrote that “the fortifying of a strong building, as a pivot upon which the defense of a 
town or village should hinge, forms a principal object of the preparations of any defending force, 
whether regular army or insurrectionary.” 180 This strategy was at the heart of the Military 
Council’s plan during the Easter Rising, as they first seized the Dublin General Post Office 
(G.P.O.), and utilized that as both their headquarters and the center of their defensive perimeter. 
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The Rising  
 
Despite MacNeill’s attempt to thwart the insurrection, Pearse ordered the Volunteers to 
assemble at 10:00 a.m. Monday morning, and Connolly had kept the majority of his men 
assembled at Liberty Hall throughout the night after insisting on carrying out their planned route 
march through Dublin on Easter Sunday.
181
 Upon receiving this news from a friend, Desmond 
FitzGerald rushed to O’Rahilly’s house to inform him the Rising was about to begin, while his 
friend went to contact MacNeill. Although O’Rahilly, had followed MacNeill’s orders and 
therefore attempted to prevent the Rising, upon learning it was still on he reportedly laughed and 
remarked, “If men are determined to have a Rising nothing will stop them.”182  
Meanwhile, sometime shortly after 10 o’clock in the morning, a group of Volunteers and 
I.C.A. men, led by Connolly, stormed the Dublin G.P.O., easily taking control of it and 
establishing it as their base of operations.
183
 However, once the G.P.O. was taken, “there was 
great confusion everywhere,”184 with many of the G.P.O. staff and occupants shocked that the 
Volunteers had actually launched a rebellion.
185
 Shortly after the G.P.O. was occupied, 
“Volunteers were stationed all around the top of the building,” and windows were smashed to 
allow Volunteers to take up firing positions from the top floors.
186
 The G.P.O. quickly became a 
rallying point for Volunteers who missed their assembly points in the morning, or who initially 
failed to mobilize due to MacNeill’s last minute counter orders the day before, and the number of 
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Volunteers occupying the G.P.O quickly increased.
187
  Even though the leaders of the Rising 
purposefully decided to leave O’Rahilly ignorant of their plans, and he had dutifully carried 
MacNeill’s orders around the countryside the previous day, he soon turned up at the G.P.O. to 
join Pearse and the others. Desmond FitzGerald marveled at O’Rahilly’s patriotism, and wrote: 
They [the I.R.B. Military Council] had doubted if O’Rahilly really meant to come 
out and risk his life, and they now saw that in the service to which he was so 
devoted he was not only ready to give his life but to give it under the command of 
those whose action had imposed upon him a mortal insult.
188
 
Most of the members on the I.R.B. Military Council were present at the G.P.O. as well, including 
Pearse, Connolly, Clarke, MacDermott, and Plunkett, who all arrived shortly after it was taken. 
At 12:45 p.m., the proclamation of the Irish Republic, issued by the new Provisional 
Government, was read aloud by Pearse:  
IRISHMEN AND IRISHWOMEN: In the name of God and of the dead 
generations from which she receives the old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, 
through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom.  
 Having organized her manhood through her secret revolutionary 
organization, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military 
organizations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently 
perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal 
itself, she now seizes that moment, and supported by her exiled children in 
America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own 
strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory.  
 We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland 
and to the unfettered control of Irish destines, to be sovereign and indefeasible. 
The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not 
extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of 
the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to 
national freedom and sovereignty; six times during the past three hundred years 
they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again 
asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic 
as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our 
comrades in arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare and of its exaltation 
among the nations. The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the 
allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The Republic guarantees religious 
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and civil liberty; equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and 
declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and 
all of it parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the 
differences carefully fostered by an alien Government, which has divided a 
minority from the majority in the past.  
 Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment 
of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of 
Ireland and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provisional 
Government, hereby constituted, will administer the civil and military affairs of 
the Republic in trust for the people.  
 We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most 
High God, Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one 
who serves the cause will dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In 
this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline, and by the 
readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself 
worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.  
 Signed on behalf of the Provisional Government: Thomas J Clarke, Sean 
Mac Diarmada, P.H. Pearse, James Connolly, Thomas Mac Donagh, Eamonn 
Ceannt, Joseph Plunkett.
189
  
 
 
The proclamation itself is a magnificent document that touches upon Irish history, notions of 
self-determination, and even women’s suffrage (several years before the 19th Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution was passed).  
 While the leadership was organizing in the G.P.O., various units of the Volunteers and 
I.C.A. were sent out to occupy strategic positions around the city. Connolly’s second in 
command, Commandant Mallin, along with the notable Countess Markievicz, took a large group 
of the I.C.A. to occupy St. Stephen’s Green.190 The men at St. Stephens quickly removed 
members of the public from the park and began entrenching themselves and establishing a 
defensive perimeter.
191
 MacDonagh and his men were sent to occupy Jacob’s Biscuit Factory on 
Bishop Street, Edward Daly occupied the Four Courts, and Eamonn Ceannt (along with his 
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second in command, Cathal Brugha) took the South Dublin Union.
192
 Although there was 
fighting throughout the day, the British reinforcements did not arrive outside the city until 
Tuesday morning, and throughout Monday the rebels all held their positions.  
 Starting on Tuesday the situation for the Volunteers deteriorated. Pearse and the other 
members of the Military Council were counting on Volunteer companies to rise up throughout 
the country, and believed that if there were risings in cities all across Ireland they would have a 
real chance at achieving victory against the British.
193
 However, due to unresolved logistical 
issues and MacNeill’s countermanding orders, revolts did not break out across the country. 
Michael Brennan, an officer in the Claire Volunteers, wrote that even before MacNeill sent his 
countermanding orders, there was confusion regarding his company’s role during the Rising: 
When I got these instructions they were so vague as the be incomprehensible. 
They amounted, in effect, to an order to mobilize on Sunday and to hold the roads 
leading into Limerick from Claire. My total armament was about thirty shotguns, 
one service rifle, two or three .22 rifles, about two revolvers and a few hundred 
rounds of ammunition. There were five or six roads spread across about five miles 
of country and I couldn’t even learn in what direction I was supposed to face – 
whether I was to prevent people getting in or getting out.
194
 
Even if there was no confusion, it seems ludicrous that a single company of Volunteers, having 
at most 4 rifles, would be tasked with preventing British movements over such a large area. 
However, to add even more confusion to the situation, Brennan wrote that once Pearse’s order 
arrived on Monday, stating the Rising was still on, “the whole controversy turned on who was 
entitled to give the orders – MacNeill or Pearse.”195 The controversy was not settled quickly, and 
as late as Tuesday, while Pearse and his men where still battling in Dublin, the Claire Volunteers 
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were still debating who to support.
196
 In other areas of the country, such as in Cork, the 
Volunteers were simply dismissed on Sunday, and were not ordered to reassemble.
197
 
 In Dublin, the Volunteers held out against British advances for five days. On Wednesday, 
Pearse sent a letter to his mother in which he stated that the men were “all in excellent spirits, 
though very sleepy.”198 However, it is likely by Wednesday Pearse already knew the battle for 
Dublin was unwinnable, as he also included in the letter that “the men have fought with 
wonderful courage and gaiety, and whatever happens to us, the name of Dublin will be splendid 
in history forever.”199 Earlier on Wednesday, Liberty Hall, the headquarters of the I.C.A., had 
been bombarded from a British Naval vessel, and although the garrison was able to escape, the 
building was completely destroyed.
200
 On Thursday Connolly was gravely wounded, and on 
Friday Evening the G.P.O. caught fire, forcing those inside to evacuate and break into houses 
along Moore Street.
201
 While leading men up Moore Street, O’Rahilly was gunned down by the 
British forces,
202
 and many provisions (including most of the Volunteer’s food) were lost with 
the G.P.O.  
 Early in the week it was easy for the Volunteers to hold out hope for a victory. Desmond 
FitzGerald reported that Monday evening there was a rumor circulating throughout the G.P.O. 
that the Germans had landed a sizable force not far from Dublin. FitzGerald wrote that “this 
information was accepted as a certainty” among the men, and added that even Pearse and 
Plunkett talked about what might become of Ireland if the Germans defeated the British in the 
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war.
203
 However, FitzGerald also reported that he “noticed a marked collapse in the general 
optimism” on either Wednesday or Thursday evening.204 By Friday, with both the G.P.O. and 
Liberty Hall destroyed, Connolly wounded, O’Rahilly dead, the surviving Volunteers in Dublin 
surrounded, and no successful insurrection anywhere else, there was simply no cause for hope. 
 It becomes clear in Pearse’s writings on Friday that he himself no longer believed the 
Volunteers could be successful. In a manifesto issued that day, Pearse wrote that even if the 
Volunteers did not win victory in battle, “they may win in it death.”205 On Saturday, the leaders 
of the Rising met, and although the decision was not unanimous, it was decided to negotiate 
terms of surrender with the British. According to Pearse, they felt that their insurrection was 
already significant enough to “to gain recognition of Ireland’s national claim at an international 
peace conference” that would inevitably take place at the war’s end.206 Furthermore, recognizing 
that their situation was unwinnable, the leaders of the Rising wanted to “prevent the further 
slaughter of the civil population” and try and save the lives of as many Volunteers as possible.207 
Pearse and the others knew that upon their surrender they would most likely be executed, and in 
a fair well letter to his mother wrote that, “our hope and belief is that the Government will spare 
the lives of all our followers, but we do not expect that they will spare the lives of the leaders.
208
  
 Pearse’s prediction was soon proved true, as he, Thomas MacDonagh, and Tom Clarke 
were the first to be executed on May 3. The following day Joseph Plunkett, Edward Daly, and 
William Pearse (Patrick Henry Pearse’s brother) were shot. In a famous episode, Plunkett was 
given special permission to wed his fiancée, Grace Gifford (who happened to be MacDonagh’s 
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sister-in-law) the night before his execution.
209
 Michael Mallin and Eamonn Ceannt were 
executed on May 8, and James Connolly (who was still gravely wounded) and Sean MacDermott 
were the last of the I.R.B. conspirators to be executed on May 12. Casement, who had been 
imprisoned in England since his arrest, was executed on August 3. In total, 16 people (including 
Casement) were executed for their role in the Rising.
210
 
 Within the city of Dublin there was considerable damage, estimated at roughly £2.5 
million,
211
 and a fair number of both civilian and military casualties. The Irish Times reported 
that 124 British military personnel (including 12 members of the R.I.C. and 3 members of the 
D.M.P.) were killed, and 388 were wounded.
212
 Although the Irish Times admitted its civilian 
estimates were “only approximate,” they calculated the civilian death toll to be around 160.213 
Since many of the fighters were spread throughout the city, sometimes hidden within houses, 
some were able to ditch their weapons and uniforms in order to escape capture and flee Dublin. 
However, many willingly laid down their arms and were taken into custody by the British.  
 
 
Role of Catholic Church in the Easter Rising and Volunteer Movement 
 
 Although there were a significant number of Protestants involved in the nationalist 
movement, some prominent members of the Catholic clergy actively supported the Volunteer 
movement and promoted Irish Nationalism.  However, the extent to which the Church as an 
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institution supported the Volunteers, or how Church involvement in the movement impacted the 
actions of the Volunteers, is both complicated and open to interpretation. The Reverend 
Monsignor Michael Curran, who served as the personal secretary to the Archbishop of Dublin 
from 1906 to 1919, discussed the Archbishop’s attitude towards and involvement with the 
nationalist movement in much detail. Curran described that:  
The Archbishop did not welcome the establishment of the Volunteers at the 
beginning. In fact he disapproved, but as events developed he realized there was 
full justification for their formation since the arms of the Ulster Volunteers 
frightened and coerced the weak English government. 
214
 
Although the Archbishop was well versed in the writings of Griffith, he expressed sentiments of 
sympathy with the Irish Nationalist cause, and was likely sympathetic to German involvement in 
the Republican struggle,
215
  Curran reports that “the Archbishop had no belief in Eoin MacNeill 
as a political and much less as a revolutionary leader.”216 Despite the Archbishop’s personal 
opinions, Curran makes it clear that the Archbishop felt he was under no obligation to interfere 
in the Volunteer’s activities. One of the few concrete actions the Archbishop took before the 
Rising was to sternly refuse the British Military’s request to place recruiting posters “on the 
railings of Catholic Churches in Dublin.”217 However this was certainly not a neutral act, since 
Volunteer companies frequently requested money for the Defense of Ireland Fund or for the 
purchase of arms and ammunition at Catholic services or outside Catholic churches.  
 Furthermore, the Archbishop and several members of the clergy were made aware of the 
Volunteer’s plans for a Rising before Easter Monday, yet made no action to prevent it. Curran 
reported that on Holy Saturday, two days before the Rising, one “well known and much 
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esteemed” officer in the Volunteers, whose identity he kept secret, informed a Catholic priest of 
the Volunteer’s plans in order to ask his opinion on the matter and “satisfy his conscience.”218 
The Priest who was consulted informed Reverend Curran, who although admitted he did not at 
the time believe the leaders of the Volunteers would seriously carry out a Rising,
219
 informed the 
Archbishop who once again refused to interfere.
220
  
 Not only was the Archbishop made aware of the Rising before it occurred, but Count 
Plunkett (the father of Joseph Plunkett) traveled to Rome before the Rising in order to inform 
Pope Benedict XV of the Volunteer’s plans. Count Plunkett’s daughter wrote that she was 
certain he was sent by those on the Military Council of the I.R.B., and described that:  
His main objective was to counteract the statement of the British Envoy to the 
Vatican, that the Irish were completely satisfied that they were democratically 
represented by John Redmond, and had accepted Home Rule as a settlement of 
the Irish question, and that the Volunteers had no moral justification, and should 
be accordingly condemned by the Church.
221
  
Curran recounts that around noon on Easter Monday he was visited by Plunkett looking to see 
the Archbishop, who was ill and in bed. When he realized the Archbishop was unavailable, 
Plunkett told Curran that the Rising was about to begin, and “that he had been to see the Pope 
and that he had informed Benedict XV of the whole Irish Situation and the Intended 
Insurrection.”222 Count Plunkett then recounted the details of his meeting with the Pope to 
Curran, who reported:  
At the end of his discussion, he asked the Pope’s Blessing for the Volunteers. 
According to him [Plunkett], the Pope showed great perturbation and asked was 
there no peaceful way out of the difficulty; that the news was extremely grave, 
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and asked had be seen the Archbishop of Dublin. [After more conversation] all 
the Pope could do was to express his profound anxiety and how much the news 
disturbed him, and asked could their object not be achieved in any other ways, 
and counselled him to see the Archbishop.
223
  
Although according to Curran the Pope did express concern regarding the Volunteer’s plan to 
stage an armed Rebellion, he never expressly forbids it. Interestingly, according to this account 
(which Curran states was later corroborated by a letter he received from another Vatican official 
who witnessed Plunkett have a private audience with the Pope) the Pope recommended 
consulting the Archbishop of Dublin not once, but twice, even though the Pope Benedict XV 
outranked him. It seems that Pope Benedict XV was more interested in placing the burden of 
whether or not to forbid the Rising on someone else, since he could have easily just told Count 
Plunkett that he did not support it.  
 Although both the Archbishop of Dublin and Pope Benedict XV effectively remained 
neutral leading up to and during the conflict, other members of the Clergy in Ireland took a much 
more active and vocal approach aiding the Republican cause. Dr. O’Dwyer, the Bishop of 
Limerick, was well known for being an ardent supporter of both the Republican movement and 
the Irish Volunteers. An associate of Bishop O’Dwyer, the Reverend Thomas J. Lavin, wrote that 
“Dr. O’Dwyer first came into prominence as a nationalist in 1915” when he vehemently and 
vocally began opposing British Military recruiting in Ireland.
224
 Bishop O’Dwyer became even 
more notable when after the Rising he openly (in letters published in the press) scorned the 
British occupation of Ireland and Sir John Maxwell, the General in charge of the British armed 
forces. Maxwell wrote to Bishop O’Dwyer, charging two Limerick Priests, Father Wall and 
Father Hayes, with actively supporting the rebels. According to Lavin:  
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One of the priests had spoken against conscription, had blessed the colours of the 
Irish Volunteers, had attended lectures by P.H. Pearse; the other had appealed to 
all members of the G.A.A. to join the Volunteers, has shown disrespect to the 
King, and had inspired disloyalty in the people by his public approval of Sinn 
Féin.
225
 
Maxwell informed Bishop O’Dwyer that “had these priests been laymen, they would have 
already been placed under arrest,” and requested that he move the two priests from any position 
that would allow them to have contact with the Irish people.
226
 In response, Bishop O’Dwyer 
told Maxwell that the two clergymen had broken no laws that he knew of, either “civil or 
ecclesiastical,” and responded:  
In your letter of 6
th
 inst. you appeal to me to help you in the furtherance of your 
work as military dictator of Ireland. Even if you action of that kind was not 
outside my province, the events of the past few weeks would make it impossible 
for me to have any part in proceedings  which I regard as wantonly cruel and 
oppressive. […] You took care that no plea for mercy should interpose on behalf 
of the poor young fellows who surrendered to you in Dublin. The first information 
which we got of their fate was the announcement that they had been shot in cold 
blood.
227
 
To finish his letter, which was read by many once it was published in the Irish Times, Bishop 
O’Dwyer concluded that “altogether your régieme has been one of the worst and blackest 
chapters in the history of the misgovernment of this country.”228  It is hard to imagine a more 
openly hostile position a high ranking member of the clergy could take, and Bishop O’Dwyer’s 
use of phrases such as “this country” make his appeal to Irish Nationalism quite clear. 
 After his correspondences with Maxwell were published, Bishop O’Dwyer continued to 
issue statements to the press and give anti-British speeches in Limerick. In August of 1916, 
Bishop O’Dwyer gave a speech recorded in the Irish Times, which was in response to 
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educational pamphlets on patriotism which the British authorities began distributing in Irish 
schools. Bishop O’Dwyer told his audience that:  
Recent events in Dublin, the perfidy of the English Government on Home Rule, 
the dishonesty with which we were promised self-government as a consideration 
for supporting England in the war, so that our people were led to believe that in 
reality it was a war for Ireland, all that and a thousand other phases of the 
duplicity which has just been revealed in Parliament, have put the Irish people in 
a temper that will not brook the trifling of England’s retainers, or accept lessons 
on Patriotism from them.
229
  
Until his death in August of 1917, Bishop O’Dwyer continued to openly support the Republican 
movement and criticize the British occupation of Ireland, specifically the treatment of Irish 
prisoners being held in English jails.
230
 Although he was perhaps the most famous Bishop 
supporting the Volunteers, the Bishop of Galway, Dr. O’Dea, was also known to have been a 
supporter of the Republican movement. Bishop O’Dea even gave his approval to the actions of 
one Galway priest, Father Feeney, who actively participated with his company of the Volunteers 
during the Rising (though Feeney was later forced into temporary political exile in America).
231
 
 Although some members of the clergy quite actively aided the Volunteers, it seems 
doubtful there was any sort of official stance by either the individual clergy or Catholic Church. 
Even Father Wall, one of those accused by Maxwell of aiding the rebels, was reported to have 
encouraged one company of Limerick Volunteers to turn in their weapons after the Rising. 
Timithy O’Shea described that:  
Some days after the surrender in Dublin, Fr. Wall called a meeting of the 
Volunteers. He advised us to surrender our arms to the R.I.C. in the local 
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barracks. Next day, headed by Fr. Wall, we marched in a body to the barracks and 
handed in about a dozen guns, including some shot guns.
232
  
Clearly even those priests who encouraged participation in the Volunteers did not openly 
encourage wanton bloodshed. Though the fact that Father Wall had such influence among his 
company of Volunteers demonstrates how important members of the clergy could be. 
Furthermore, some members of the clergy were entirely unsympathetic to the Volunteer 
movement.  Richard Walsh, who was arrested by the British for his role in smuggling arms, 
wrote that while he was imprisoned was approached by a priest (serving as a British Army 
Chaplin) who attempted to persuade him to hand over the weapons, which were hidden with 
some of his fellow Volunteers. Walsh wrote that at times the priest became agitated with him, 
and “brought every pressure possible to bear on us to hand over the rifles unconditionally.”233 
Although Catholic Priests working directly with the British seem to be a rarity, in Curran’s 
detailed account of the Rising he admits that some priests he addressed in the cathedral were 
anxious of the Rising, and explains that he described Count Plunkett’s meeting with the Pope to 
them “partially because [he] knew one or two of them were not friendly” to the Volunteer’s 
cause.
234
 Although there were clearly Catholic Priests who supported the Irish Volunteers, it was 
an individual decision, and even if the Archbishop of Dublin was sympathetic to the Volunteer’s 
cause, no formal position was ever adopted by the clergy’s hierarchy.  
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The Age Old Struggle 
 
 The Irish Volunteers who participated in the Easter Rising encountered the same age old 
problem as their forefathers. Although Pearse believed that the rest of the Volunteers would rise 
up elsewhere around the country while the city of Dublin was under siege, he was mistaken. 
Once again an Irish rebellion failed because only a small force of Irishman attempted to take on 
the great might of the British Empire, and although the Volunteers of Dublin fought valiantly, it 
was inevitable that without outside support they would be defeated. However, public perception 
of the Volunteers would soon take a drastic turn. Many people agreed with Bishop O’Dwyer’s 
assessment of Maxwell’s rule in the aftermath of the Rising, and even those who were not 
initially supportive of the Rising were shocked at the brutal expediency in which the executions 
of its leaders were carried out.  
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4. An Orgy of Terror and Destruction 
 
Internment in Prison Camps  
 
 After Pearse’s unconditional surrender in Dublin, Volunteer companies all around the 
city began to lay down their arms and allow the British forces (be it the R.I.C., D.M.P, or 
Military) to take them into custody. Although some of the insurgents, like Desmond FitzGerald, 
managed to escape by ditching their weapons and uniform in order to blend in with the general 
population,
235
 many others willing subjected themselves to capture. Joseph Lawless, who was a 
member of a Volunteer company located a short distance outside Dublin during the Rising, 
described that after Pearse’s order to surrender arrived their Company’s officers contacted the 
R.I.C. in order to inform them they were hold out in an old farmhouse. While the Volunteers 
were waiting for the R.I.C. to arrive, Lawless and one of his comrades considered fleeing to the 
countryside with their supplies and arms. However, according to Lawless he was persuaded 
against doing so by his father:  
He opened by saying that of course we could do as we pleased, but should 
remember that we as a body had given an implied bond in our formal surrender, 
and that if we hoped to be treated by the enemy as honorable foes, we must honor 
our word by, initially at any rate, placing ourselves at their disposal.
236
 
The Volunteers genuinely considered themselves prisoners of war, rather than captured rebels or 
criminals, which would become a major point of contention between interned Volunteers and the 
British authorities. Lawless described that while being escorted to a British prison:  
Almost the whole way along he [a British solider] cursed us fervently and went 
into all the gory details of what he would like to do to us if he had his way. “Here 
I am” said he, “having come safely through two blankety years in the blankety 
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trenches in France, come here for a blankety rest, and then run the chance of 
getting a blankety bullet from a lot of blank-blank-blanks like you,” and so on, ad 
nauseam. 
237
 
Furthermore, Lawless noted that a few months later, when he complained about the conditions in 
Knutsford prison, the prison guards simply replied that the interned Volunteers were “a damn 
sight better off than the chaps in the trenches in Flanders.”238 From the perspective of many 
British soldiers, the Volunteers were traitors, who attempted to stab the British Empire in the 
back while its valiant soldiers fought for the survival of the Empire in the trenches of Europe. 
The fact that the leadership of the I.R.B. was actively working with the Germans only reinforced 
that belief.  
Both in Dublin and in the countryside, men destroyed their rifles or hid their equipment 
before being arrested by the British. Lawless described this as “a reaction equivalent to the old 
custom of breaking the sword before handing it over.”239 When the R.I.C. arrived the names and 
addresses of the Volunteers were recorded,
240
 and the Volunteers who surrendered were soon 
escorted by the British military to ships, sometimes cattle boats,
241
 and taken to either prisons or 
internment camps in England.  
Overall, the conditions in the internment camps were not terribly harsh. Lawless and his 
comrades were first taken to Knutsford Prison, where they were kept in normal prison cells.
242
 
There Lawless claimed that the Volunteers were given only enough food to barely sustain them, 
and were prevented from congregating or socializing together. However, after several months the 
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British Government relaxed many of the restrictions, and the interned Volunteers were allowed 
to received packages and assemble together. Once that occurred:  
New friendships were formed and old ones cemented [in Knutsford], and later in 
Frongoch, which formed the basis of the new revolutionary movement that grew 
rapidly in Ireland when we had regained our personal liberty by the amnesty 
granted at the following Christmas.
243
 
After a time, Lawless and the Volunteers kept at Knutsford prison were transferred to Frongoch, 
were many prominent Volunteers (such as Sean T. O’Kelly, Ernest Blythe, Michael Collins, and 
many others) were held.  
 According to William O’Brien, who wrote about his experiences at Frongoch, “the 
conditions on the whole were not bad.”244 The prisoners were required to take care of their own 
cooking and cleaning, and generally ran things within the camp.
245
 They also organized concerts 
in the dining hall, and competitions on the athletic field, all the while maintaining close contact 
with their friends, family, and comrades back in Ireland.
246
 Frongoch was not the only camp 
Volunteers were kept at, but even in other places conditions were reported to be similar. 
However, while conditions within the camps were generally acceptable, the British tightened 
their control and heightened their military presence back in Ireland.  
As Lawless described, “the Rising had not the support of one-twentieth of the people of 
Ireland when it began.”247 During the Rising itself mobs of Dubliners chased insurgents down, or 
tried to aid the British military in capturing them.
248
 A few members of unionist militia groups 
even fought alongside the British forces during the rising, and while the Volunteers who did 
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surrender after the Rising were being taken away by British forces many women, especially the 
wives of those serving in the British military,  were extremely hostile to towards them.
249
  
Although the Easter Rising of 1916 was not a popular revolt, it allowed the Volunteers a vital 
opportunity to cement themselves as a power in Ireland. They gained the support of the people 
after their leaders were executed and they were imprisoned, and the British made the fatal error 
of keeping them interned in camps together, which allowed them to analyze their past actions 
and continue to plan for the future. This period of introspection would eventually lead to the 
Volunteer’s reorganization as the Irish Republican Army (or I.R.A.). As Edgar Holt, a scholar of 
Irish history so eloquently described, after the Volunteer’s internment “instead of professors, 
poets, school masters, and trade-union organizers, the leaders of Ireland’s protest were young 
men who made revolution their whole and only career."
250
 
 
 
 
Regrouping and Reorganizing 
 
After the failed Easter Rising there was relatively little violence until the end of 1918.
251
 
However, during that period the Sinn Fein political party became increasingly popular, and the 
British were met with increasing hostility. Many of the prisoners taken during the Easter Rising 
continued making plans and training even while interned in British prison camps.
252
 These men 
certainly had not given up the fight, and when released from the prison camps in 1917, many 
joined the Sinn Fein Party and rejoined or reorganized their old Volunteer companies. Sinn Fein 
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actually had relatively little to do with the Easter Rising itself,
253
 but was soon appropriated by 
the Irish Volunteers.  Sinn Fein’s message began to radicalize, eventually calling for an end of 
the British foreign invasion in the sovereign nation of Ireland.
254
 During this period even the 
Catholic Church began openly allying itself with the revitalized Sinn Fein, started vigorously 
opposing the policy of conscription, to the extent that some parishes even read a pledge of 
disobedience to the British Crown at every mass.
255
 
One of the first tasks of the Irish Volunteers was to rearm itself, since many weapons 
were either destroyed or seized by the British after the Easter Rising, and many companies had 
very few weapons when they reorganized.
256
 To do this, companies of  Irish Volunteers 
organized raids to search people’s homes, especially those of British officers, ex-military, or 
loyalists, in order to seize arms.
257
 However, even those sympathetic to the Republican 
movement often had their weapons stolen, and as one Volunteer described, “the majority of the 
guns taken were obsolete.”258  Training progressed similarly as it did before the Easter Rising, 
with drills, lectures on tactics and the use of arms, etc. However, the Volunteers were no longer 
permitted to parade in the streets, and all training had to be done in secret.
259
 
The threat of conscription into the British Army appalled many Irishmen, even among 
those who previously had been apathetic to the Republican movement. Ireland had been spared 
from the first act of conscription during the Great War, but as the war dragged on and the British 
became desperate for fresh recruits, the British Government began to contemplate expanding 
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their policy of conscription to include Ireland, which had a significant, albeit temporary, effect 
on the Volunteers. Patrick Clifford, a member of the Irish Volunteers, wrote that:  
During the conscription scare in 1918 large numbers joined the company, 
and the strength increased to about 150 at one stage. Many of those who joined at 
that time took no further part tin the movement when the conscription scare had 
passed and the strength of the unit fell to about 60.
260
  
 
Before the scare his Mitchelstown Company numbered around only 40 men, meaning over 100 
men in the Mitchelstown area joined the Volunteers simply because they opposed conscription.  
Clifford was not the only one to report large spikes in membership, and other companies reported 
that their membership topped 100 during this period,
261
 which would have been unheard of in the 
months before. Although many of the men left once the threat of conscription was over, the 
increased support for both the Volunteers and Sinn Fein helped pave the way to their expedient 
recovery.  
The situation became even more complicated when those elected to parliament under the 
Sinn Fein banner decided to form their own parliamentary body in Dublin, rather than travel to 
Westminster and take the seats in the British Parliament. On January 21, 1919, the Dáil Eireann, 
or Irish Parliament, first met in Dublin, even though 34 of the 73 elected members remained in 
British custody.
262
 To support the new provisional government, some members of the Irish 
Volunteers began selling bonds to support the Dáil.
263
 The Fianna even changed its oath, making 
young boys pledge “allegiance to the Irish Republic,” rather than pledge “to work for the 
independence of Ireland.”264  
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As discontent with the British increased, there was also a rise of violence against both the 
R.I.C. and British forces. Soon the Irish Volunteers were reorganized under the banner of the 
Dáil, and became known as the Irish Republican Army.  The I.R.A. rapidly began utilizing a 
strategy of both urban and rural guerrilla warfare, ambushing British patrols, stealing British 
supplies or intelligence, and assassinating key British officers and officials. A complicated 
system of intelligence gathering and counterintelligence developed on both sides that saw many 
executed for espionage or killed in the line of duty. In such a volatile situation reprisal killings 
became common place, and many people were killed before a treaty was finally signed.  
 
 
Guerrilla Tactics  
 
Shortly after the Easter Rising, Irish membership in the R.I.C. began to drastically 
decrease, as few Irish would join and there was a sharp increase in resignations.
265
 Many were 
shocked by the violence in Dublin during the Rising, and the Sinn Fein party organized a boycott 
of everything having to do with the police – even to the extreme that undertakers would refuse to 
handle the bodies of deceased R.I.C. men.
266
 In response, the British were forced to bring in 
English soldiers and auxiliaries, many of whom were veterans of World War I.
267
  The British 
also recruited men to the reserve of the R.I.C., who were referred to as either “Black and Tans” 
or simply “Tans.”  The Black and Tans quickly became known for their brutality, and were 
frequent targets of the Irish Republican Army. Starting in early 1919, after the establishment of 
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the Dáil Eireann, violence between members of the I.R.A. and British forces broke out, and 
guerrilla warfare pitted the I.R.A. against the British forces in Ireland.  
 Both sides of the conflict utilized what could be considered terrorist tactics, although they 
usually targeted military personnel or insurgents – not civilians. Regardless, these tactics were 
aimed at inciting fear and destroying either English or Irish morale. Vincent Rice, a Dublin 
Lawyer, wrote that “far and beyond any yea or nay, the British Government under Lloyd George 
had settled on a policy of murder, arson, looting, and armed terrorism of the civil population in 
Ireland in order to suppress the insurrection movement.”268 Although there are many reports of 
British soldiers behaving in such a manner, the I.R.A. utilized very similar tactics. In one 
example, the I.R.A. determined where several British officers were boarding, and in the dead of 
night broke into the house and shot the officers while still in their beds. As one I.R.A. operative 
who was working undercover in Dublin Castle wrote following the incident, “in the Castle, 
pandemonium reigned. An officer, whose pals had been wiped out, shot himself in his room. The 
tragedy was hushed up.”269 Furthermore, he continued that, “a long string of cars and baggage 
choked the Castle gate all day. Officers, Secret Service men and their wives were flying to 
protection and a room could not be found in the Castle for love nor money.”270 
 The British forces in Ireland were forced to be in a constant state of alert, as the I.R.A. 
would strike at any time – whether they were on a patrol in the countryside or walking down the 
streets of Dublin.  One member of the Dublin brigade, Joseph Byrne, described that for 
ambushes within the city the company would be split up into small groups of men. Byrne wrote 
that:  
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The method was to have a scout in front of us patrolling, to report back any 
approach of lorries or tenders. Only about six of us took part actually in this type 
of operation and we worked with groups of two on each side of the street. […] As 
the military came within range we attacked with grenades.
271
  
 
Members of the Dublin brigade would go out nearly every night, with the exception of 
Sundays,
272
 in order to try and wreak as much havoc as they could. Half on the men would be 
responsible for setting up ambushes Monday through Wednesday, and the other half from 
Thursday to Saturday.
273
  Byrne continued that his ambushes were quite successful, and bragged 
that “as a result of one ambush there were military funerals through the streets every day for a 
whole week.”274 One of the most infamous acts of the I.R.A. occurred on November 21, 1920, 
known afterwards as Bloody Sunday. On Saturday, the entire Dublin Brigade of the I.R.A. was 
mobilized and ordered to meet at their company’s headquarters. As Patrick McCrea described, 
“in short, the operation was the elimination, on Sunday morning at 9 o’clock, of enemy spies and 
agents who had been listed by G.H.Q. Intelligence as men that should be executed as a military 
necessity.”275 Groups of men were assigned specific targets, and early Sunday morning groups of 
I.R.A. men assembled around Dublin and proceeded to their respective target’s location. The 
Irish Times reported that “all the houses [of those killed] had been marked; the streets were 
watched and patrolled; [and] an hour was chosen when the victims would be most helpless and 
unprepared.”276 12 British officers were killed in one fell swoop, and several were wounded.277  
However, not all I.R.A. ambushes were successful, and on many occasions I.R.A. 
companies waited hidden alongside a road for a convoy of British soldiers who never arrived. In 
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other instances, companies were forced to abandon an ambush and retreat when their grenades or 
explosive devices failed to detonate, or they were quickly outgunned and overrun by the vastly 
superior British military.
278
 
 The I.R.A.’s strategy in the countryside was similar to their overall strategy in the city – 
hit the enemy hard and fast, then retreat. In nearly every engagement members of the I.R.A. were 
equipped with inferior weapons, and a long protracted fight was almost never desired. However, 
sometimes they did occur, since after the Easter Rising possession of arms was an offense 
punishable by death. Thomas Barry, who served as a Captain in the Cork I.R.A. described that 
one day he and his column were hiding from a company of Tans and R.I.C., with little desire to 
fight. Despite their attempt to avoid the enemy, Barry wrote that, “we were fully armed at the 
time, and we had no option but to fight, as martial law was in force and it was the case of being 
executed for carrying arms.”279 Since Barry decided to engage the Black and Tans, the company 
was able to break through the British lines and retreat with limited casualties. If they had been 
captured they would have been quickly executed. In situations like these, British policy actually 
contributed to the increased violence, and prohibited members of the I.R.A. from surrendering.  
 The I.R.A. also attempted to sabotage British supply and communication lines as often as 
possible. Frequently, the I.R.A. would cut telegraph and telephone lines, and trench the sides of 
the roads, giving them ample cover from which to launch ambushes. Even if there was no I.R.A. 
force present, a trenched road would be extremely intimidating for a British force to travel, as an 
attack could come from anywhere at any time. I.R.A. companies would also fell trees across 
roads, forcing a British vehicle to stop at the site of the ambush.
280
 Hit and run style raids on 
British or R.I.C. barracks were also extremely common, but not always successful. However, 
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sometimes the I.R.A. utilized informants, sympathizers, or agents serving in the R.I.C. to aid 
them. One R.I.C. Constable from Meath described:  
[The] Trim R.I.C. Barracks was captured by the I.R.A. on 26
th
 September 1920. 
They were helped from the inside, a door which leads on the Fair Green being left 
open for them. Constable Meehan, now a superintendent in the Civic Guards, at 
Granard, was responsible for this.
281
  
 
Like many of the I.R.A.’s victories, the attack on the Trim barracks was met with a harsh 
response from the British Auxiliaries. According to Seamus Finn, an Adjutant from the Meath 
Brigade of the I.R.A.:  
The worst of the British official reprisals for the destruction of Trim R.I.C. 
barracks were not launched until approximately 4 o’clock on Monday morning 
when about 200 Auxiliaries and Black & Tans from Gormanstown descended 
upon the town and began an orgy of terror and destruction.
282
  
 
According to Finn, roughly one quarter of the population was massacred, and much of the town 
was burnt.  
 
 
Reprisals  
 
The conflict following the Easter Rising saw acts of violence, revenge, murder, and terror 
become almost commonplace. British soldiers stationed in Ireland would behave in ways that 
would not have been acceptable if stationed elsewhere, and members of the I.R.A. answered their 
brutality with their own. One Second Lieutenant in the British Army wrote that, “The war office 
was greatly concerned because the troops in Dublin had been looting, an offense for which they 
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would be shot if they were in France.”283 However, the troops who looted where not shot, and  
over the course of the war the Black and Tans specifically developed a reputation in particular as 
being merciless and brutal, prompting one Irishman to refer to their occupation as a “Reign of 
Terror.”284 Even some working for the British Authorities were appalled by the behavior of the 
Black and Tans, and one former Constable in the R.I.C. wrote that upon the signing of the 1921 
treaty, “the ordinary rank and file of the R.I.C. were generally pleased that Ireland at least had 
succeeded in getting somewhere. As far as the Black and Tans were concerned, they did not give 
a damn, they were soldiers of fortune.” 285 
 Looting or other acts of revenge became so common that it was the expected behavior 
after a raid or ambush by the I.R.A. One former Captain in the I.R.A. wrote that after a raid on a 
British patrol, “we remained around the village in case of reprisals. Although the military did 
arrive out and searched the houses they did not do any damage except the usual looting.”286 In 
other cases the Irish were not so lucky. Vincent Rice, a Dublin lawyer wrote that “in one week 
the terrorists [either British soldiers or Black and Tans] sacked the towns of Balbriggan, 
Miltown-Malby, Ennisymor, Lahinch, Mallow, and Trim, murdering ‘as often as not.’”  British 
Auxiliaries often targeted the homes of known I.R.A. affiliates, and many saw their houses 
damaged or even burned. In cases in which there were exceptionally brutal British soldiers or 
Auxiliaries, the I.R.A. would try to respond in kind. One of the agents working undercover for 
the I.R.A. intelligence unit wrote that:  
As a matter of interest, the addresses obtained from private correspondence of 
Auxiliary Cadets helped to establish the identity of these people, together with 
their home addresses in Great Britain. After the burning and sacking of Irish 
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towns, reprisals were taken by the I.R.A. in Great Britain by burning some of the 
Cadet’s homes.287 
 
Of course, many Auxiliaries or Regulars did not actively choose to be deployed in Ireland, and 
certainly most were not simply sadistic.  One former British soldier wrote that “during the first 
great war [he] served in Egypt, the Dardanelles, Suez Canal, Salonika, and in Palestine” before 
his unit was transferred to Ireland in 1919.
288
 Some soldiers were simply stationed in Ireland, 
where they would become targets for simply driving a supply truck from base to base. It is not 
hard to imagine the sense of betrayal some soldiers might feel after having survived the horrors 
of World War I only to see their comrades gunned down by those who were supposed to be loyal 
to the Crown in an area that was supposed to be part of their own nation.  One former Lieutenant 
in the British Army, Geoffry Ibberson, who fought and was wounded at the battle of 
Tourmakeady, admitted sometimes passions got the better of the men fighting. Ibberson wrote:  
I realize that what ruled my actions that afternoon was anger and desire for 
revenge (this latter, in any case being an unpraiseworthy quality) at seeing the 
bodies of those simple men of the R.I.C. loyal to their uniforms, stretched out on 
the ground at Tourmakeday.
289
 
 
Ibberson was so enraged during the battle, that he took off in pursuit of the retreating I.R.A. 
column with only two other men, and shot and killed some of them as they continued to 
withdraw.  
Many Sinn Feiners, sympathizers with the I.R.A., or family members of known I.R.A. 
soldiers were arrested by the British as a way deterring aid to or participation in the I.R.A. 
Targeting family members was also a tactic used to punish those on the run. One I.R.A. fighter 
described that when the British authorities could not find him, they arrested his brother in his 
place. Being from a rural area, he described that the arrest of his brother was a huge burden to his 
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family, since with both the men gone only his mother and sister were left to manage their family 
farm.
290
 
Although the Tans in particular acquired a reputation for brutality, the regulars of the 
R.I.C. were not free of corruption themselves, and there are many alleged incidents of members 
carrying out brutal killings alongside the Black and Tans. In one allegation, the Head Constable 
of Meath, who had a daughter that worked in the post office and was frequently chastised by her 
boss, had her boss “taken from his house by three armed men in civilian clothes and shot and 
thrown into the river.” 291 The Constable, who was aided by his brother, the County Inspector for 
the R.I.C., and a Tan, then covered up the crime by pinning on the I.R.A.
292
 In another example, 
Mary Clancy, the widow of Limerick Mayor George Clancy, wrote that “in the final stages of the 
Terror, armed forces of the crown raided private houses with the set purpose of murdering 
prominent Republicans.
293
 Her husband was one of those republicans murdered, and was shot in 
his home by three disguised men, while he was still Mayor of Limerick! Mary herself was shot 
and wounded in the attack, and was later put under the protection of the I.R.A., who stood guard 
around her house following the attack.
294
  
However, some members of the R.I.C. had different attitudes than the British soldiers or 
Auxiliaries, and were even sympathetic to the republican movement. For example, one R.I.C. 
Constable from Meath wrote that before the Rising and “during the Home Rule movement the 
Police were generally disinterested, and I would say that the majority of them were in favor of 
Home Rule.
295
 Prior to the Rising the police were required to attend the Volunteers’ parades and 
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assemblies, but there was little violence.
296
 However, after the Rising R.I.C. barracks became a 
prime target of the I.R.A., and some members of the R.I.C. were targeted by the I.R.A. and shot, 
creating fierce animosity between the R.I.C. and the I.R.A.  
 Anger over the death of comrades was relatively common reason for British or R.I.C. 
forces to lash out. While imprisoned, one I.R.A. member was pulled from his cell by a group of 
Tans. He was then forced to look at the body of a Tan who had been killed in a recent ambush, 
was beat over the head with a revolver, then forced to run around the prison yard while the Tans 
fired shots at him. The Tans did not care that he was imprisoned during the ambush which killed 
their friend – they simply wanted to vent their anger.297 In another case, Patrick Lennon reported 
that a group of Black and Tans went into his house searching for him, and upon finding the 
house empty proceeded to bayonet his dog.
298
 
   
   
Intelligence and Counter Intelligence  
 
 Intelligence gathering was crucial for both the I.R.A. and the British authorities. The 
British invested much time and many resources into infiltrating the I.R.A. In response, the I.R.A. 
established its own intelligence division led by Michael Collins, who recruited agents serving in 
Dublin Castle, the R.I.C., or Dublin Metropolitan Police (D.M.P.) to send intelligence reports to 
the I.R.A. Early in the conflict it proved difficult to gain access to sources of information within 
the British forces, since everyone in the civil service was required to take an oath of loyalty to 
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the British Crown.
299
 One member of Collins’s intelligence unit noted that in the early days of 
their operation even “the amount of information gathered through interception, raids on mails, 
etc. was rather limited, due to [a] lack of co-operators.
300
 Another of Collins’ operatives cited 
that “there were scarcely a half dozen” members of the D.M.P. aiding Collins’ unit.301  Even 
when the unit received information, sometimes they were so short staffed they failed to act on it. 
Several members of the I.R.A. were arrested by the British forces because no one from Collins’s 
unit was able to notify them before they were located by the authorities.
302
 Collins would often 
clandestinely meet his contacts himself, rather than send someone in his stead. According to one 
of his informants within the Mountjoy Prison, even when the two of them were almost 
apprehended by the British forces “Mick was cool, calm, and collected and did not show any 
fright.”303 Although there were never many informants working for Collin’s intelligence unit, 
over time they grew more sophisticated and did manage to recruit more informants, with some in 
high level positions.  
David Neligan, who resigned from the D.M.P. after the violence escalated, was 
convinced by Collins to rejoin the force and act as an I.R.A. agent. The I.R.A. arranged for 
threatening letters to be sent to Neligan, so he could rejoin under the premise that he did not feel 
safe returning to his home in the countryside.
304
  Neligan rejoined the D.M.P., and eventually 
worked his way up the ranks to obtain a position within the British Secret Service, ironically 
tasked with infiltrating the I.R.A. and hunting down people like himself.  Agents like Neligan 
helped supply the I.R.A. with crucial information, such as to whom the British planned on 
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arresting and when, giving them ample time to avoid capture. Furthermore, Collins used his 
agents to help supply the British with false intelligence reports. Neligan described:  
I was expected to make an intelligence report once a week. Collins often helped 
me to write these reports; in fact, he wrote them himself. Many a good laugh we 
had over them! He used to say in these reports that the I.R.A. was in no way short 
of arms or ammunition; recruits were simply falling over each other; they had 
plenty of money; new columns were being formed to fight the British.
305
  
 
According to Neligan, these reports were believed by his superiors in the British Secret Service, 
and were effective at creating a sense of apprehension among the British in Dublin, who were 
plagued by shootings, murders, and assassinations, with no end in sight.  
 A special group within Collins’ intelligence unit dubbed “The Squad” or “The Twelve 
Apostles,” was “formed to carry out individual shootings of enemy agents and spies.”306 The 
Squad was put under the direct command of Paddy Daly, but worked under Collins’ authority as 
a part of the I.R.A.’s General Headquarters, or G.H.Q. The Squad would sometimes be given a 
specific target to assassinate, but other times would just be ordered to patrol the city and open 
fire on any Tan or British Officer they encountered.
307
 The Squad also took on especially 
dangerous missions, including attempts to rescue high value prisoners from British custody. 
Originally, the Squad consisted of only 12 men, but later grew to 21 members, and was divided 
up into 3 separate squads.
308
 
 Unsurprisingly, many innocents were killed in the crossfire between Collins’s Squad and 
their British targets, who were often spies dressed in normal clothing and attempting to blend in 
with the civilian population. Neligan wrote that on one occasion in particular:  
Collins’s squad did attack a bunch of plain-clothed men outside the Castle and 
killed three of them…those poor wretches were merely dispatch riders and were 
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mistakenly taken for members of the Igo gang [who had been murdering I.R.A. 
sympathizers]. 
309
 
 
Friendly fire was also a risk, and on at least one occasion, undercover I.R.A. agents working for 
the British were mistakenly shot by their own men, who had taken it on themselves to target 
British agents.  
 To counter Collins’s men, the British employed their own sophisticated methods of 
counterintelligence. An entire plain clothed unit of the D.M.P., called the “G” Division, was 
tasked with eliminating members of the I.R.A. and gathering intelligence. The “G” Division 
frequently surveilled known members of the I.R.A. and their sympathizers, and  “every ‘G’ man 
kept a journal in which he entered the names of political suspects he had seen that day and other 
relevant data in connection with his work watching the revolutionaries.”310  It was also not 
uncommon for members in this unit to gun down high profile I.R.A. members in the street.
311
 
Furthermore, any time there was an incident involving the shooting of British personnel there 
would be a thorough investigation by the unit. During these investigations the “G” men would 
often interrogate possible I.R.A. informants, and attempt to get them to double cross the I.R.A.
312
  
 Members of the I.R.A. who were captured by the British often tried to resist 
interrogations, and minimize the amount of information that would fall into British hands. 
Important documents would be carefully hidden from the British, or destroyed if likely to fall 
into British hands.
313
 When Patrick Lawson was arrested with a roster of his Company’s 
members, he describes how he went through extraordinary lengths to safeguard the information: 
I was kept in the guardroom [at Dublin Castle] and a Volunteer named J.P. Ryan, 
the company I.O. was put next to me. We discussed the predicament I was in 
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having the company rolls on my person, and we decided that there was nothing 
for it but to chew and eat the pages containing the names. It was a terrible job.
314
  
 
Lawson also noted that during his unit’s imprisonment, one of their men was so badly injured 
from the interrogation he was not fit to be transferred to a prison with the rest of them.  
In the event an informant or I.R.A. member did turn and begin giving information to the 
British, the I.R.A. dealt with them quite harshly. If a member of the I.R.A. was caught spying or 
behaving insubordinately they were often “sentenced” to death. Neligan described the lengths to 
which the I.R.A. would go to in order to carry out its justice: 
The escaped prisoner [from British custody] was a man named Fowargue. Collins 
afterwards told us that he had recently joined the Volunteers and on being arrested 
betrayed his comrades and volunteered to work for the English. He was shot in 
England afterwards by the I.R.A. over there. Joe Shanahan and Reggie Dunne 
executed him at some golf course outside London.
315
  
 
Furthermore, Collins and other members of his intelligence unit were very weary of who they 
brought in to become an informant. Even if someone approached them with good intentions, 
overzealous amateurs posed as much of a threat as double agents, since they could be easily 
flipped, followed, or fed misinformation by the British.
316
 
 British Secret Service agents and members of the “G” Division were also weary of being 
double crossed. Secret Service agents, who were brought in when some in the British 
Government felt the “G” Division had lost its effectiveness, were boarded in the homes of 
carefully vetted loyalists, who were often Freemasons or those who had protestant servants.
317
  
The British also employed more subtle schemes to try and undermine the I.R.A. In one 
case, the British rigged large quantities of ammunition to misfire in the rifle barrel. This 
ammunition was then purposefully allowed to fall into I.R.A. hands, in the hopes that it would be 
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distributed among the members.
318
 However, Neligan discovered the plot while working 
undercover in Dublin Castle, and alerted Collins, who got the word out that any cartridge with 
the marking “z.z.” was faulty.319 Unlike the Fenian Uprising of 1867, this time the Irish rebels 
were not easily infiltrated by British agents, and were in fact quite successful at infiltrating the 
British forces themselves.  
 
 
 
 
The Truce and Treaty  
 
 As the war dragged on, British public opinion began to drift towards reconciliation. 
British officers and soldiers continued to be gunned down by the I.R.A., who also targeted any 
loyalist or civilian who happened to inform the British authorities of their movements or plans.
320
  
From 1919 until the time of the truce, the British government recorded that 405 police had been 
killed with 682 wounded, 150 members of the Military had been killed with 345 wounded, and 
196 civilians had been killed with 185 wounded.
321
 The cycle of violence clearly began weighing 
on the British public’s mind, and in one editorial for the London Times, the author wrote that 
“not only have reprisals demonstrably failed in their object, but their continuance has involved 
consequences that make any other policy increasingly difficult.”322  Other Englishman viewed 
the situation more pragmatically, and simply did not see the value of continuing the conflict. 
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Another editorial argued that “the present conditions in Ireland can not continue; if they do I am 
firmly convinced that Ireland will be ruined.”323  
 Although the British personnel had vastly superior weapons and equipment, and the 
I.R.A. was always desperately short on arms and ammunition, members of the I.R.A. vastly 
outnumbered the British soldiers stationed in Ireland. It was estimated that the British employed 
about 50,000 troops in Ireland (35,000 regulars, 12,500 R.I.C. and Black and Tans, and 1,500 
Auxiliaries) while the I.R.A. was estimated to number somewhere around 112,000 (even though 
only a mere fraction of that number was ever active in the field at any one time).
324
 Soon, even 
some members of the British government began favoring some sort of diplomatic solution. The 
Better Government of Ireland Act passed in 1920 created two separate Parliaments for the 6 
counties of Ulster and the remainder of Southern Ireland, in a scheme similar to the Home Rule 
bill that failed to pass before the First World War. However, in order to be recognized by the 
British Government at least half of the elected members to the parliament had to take an oath of 
allegiance to King George V. On the day in which the oath was to be administered (June 28, 
1921) only 4 of the 128 members of the southern Parliament were present, therefore preventing 
the British Government from officially recognizing it as the Parliament of Southern Ireland.
325
  
 Clearly, the Better Government of Ireland Act was not a success in the south, but at a 
speech before the Ulster Parliament on June 22, King George V called for a “new era of peace, 
contentment and goodwill” in Ireland.326 This speech influenced some policy makers in England, 
but preliminary negotiations had already begun in early April when Lord Derby met with the 
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President of the Dáil, Éamon de Valera.
327
 The I.R.A. was determined to keep fighting until the 
end, and the initiative for truce negotiations came not from the I.R.A. or Dáil, but from members 
of the British Government.
328
 
 On July 11, 1921, the Truce was announced to members of the I.R.A. and British 
military. Michael Brennan wrote that after news of the truce reached them: 
We were surrounded by an almost hysterical crowd. One of the most excited was 
a British sergeant (named Doyle I think) wearing the ribbon of the Victoria Cross 
on his tunic. We were, of course, fully armed and equipped and our appearance 
was tangible proof that “The Terror” was ended.329 
However, many in the I.R.A. and I.R.B. did not think the Truce would last. Brennan wrote that 
“Collins, Mulcahy, Gearoid O’Sullivan, and others [from G.H.Q] all emphasized that they didn’t 
expect the Truce to last very long, and that it must be used to improve our organization and 
training.”330 Cathal Brugha, who at the time was serving as the Dáil’s Minister of Defense, was 
notoriously skeptical of the Truce and initially feared that if the I.R.A. accepted it they would 
lose the initiative, and would have difficulty resuming their guerrilla campaign against the 
British.
331
  Brugha, with Collins’ blessing, had the I.R.A. use the Truce as an opportunity to 
rearm, collect more ammunition, and continue training.
332
  During a subsequent Dáil debate on 
the treaty, Brugha even concocted a scheme in which he and a few others would launch a 
suicidal attack on the British House of Commons with the intention of gunning down as many 
Cabinet Ministers as possible before being killed by the British security forces.
333
 
 However, both Collins and de Valera were strongly in favor of accepting the Truce and 
sending a peace delegation to London. As Ernest Blythe put it, “at that time, when Collins and de 
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Valera were in agreement on any point, there was practically no possibility that the majority of 
the Cabinet would go against them.”334 Several delegations were sent to negotiate, and 
eventually a final delegation consisting of Robert Barton, George Gavan Duffy, Eamonn 
Duggan, Arthur Griffith, and Michael Collins was presented with a treaty to sign and bring back 
to the Dáil to be ratified. 
 The treaty itself established the Irish Free State, which would be an equal member of the 
British Commonwealth equivalent to Canada, Australia, or South Africa. However, a 
representative of the Crown (equivalent to the Governor General of Canada) would still be 
appointed, and members of the Dáil would be required to swear loyalty to the Irish Free State, 
but also state “that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V., [and] his heirs and successors by 
law.” Furthermore, the Irish Free State would not be permitted to have a military that was 
proportionally larger (in terms of population) than that of Great Britain, and the Royal Navy 
would continue to provide for the coastal defense of Ireland until the Irish Free State established 
its own Navy. No Irish ports could refuse entry to British ships (or vice versa), and some British 
military personnel would be allowed to remain on Irish soil.
335
 The terms of the Treaty sat 
uneasy with some, especially the clause about being faithful to the Crown, and both Gavan Duffy 
and Robert Barton were initially reluctant to sign the treaty. However, Lloyd George assured the 
Irish delegation that if all 5 did not sign there would once again be open war with England, and 
Barton described that both he and Duffy felt that the two of them alone did not have the authority 
to commit Ireland to war.
336
  Therefore, on December 6, 1921 the Treaty was signed by all five 
delegates. 
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 Although the Treaty was signed by both the Irish and British delegates, each parliament 
was required to ratify it. Once the Treaty was returned to the Dáil, there was intense debate 
among the representatives, with some arguing against the treaty. According to Barton, “President 
de Valera issued a manifesto on his own behalf, disagreeing with the Articles before the Dáil 
met.”337 Gavan Duffy, who was reluctant to sign it in London, also openly spoke out against the 
treaty. This created considerable conflict within the Dáil, and Barton described that once Duffy 
spoke out:  
For three hours we had the most frightful battle in the delegation, among 
ourselves, at which the most terrific things were said to Gavan Duffy and to me 
by Collins, Griffith and Duggan. They called us murderers, stated that we would 
be hanged from lamp posts, and that we would destroy all they had fought for.
338
  
 
 Griffith led the campaign for the ratification of the treaty in the Dáil, arguing that “I signed the 
Treaty not as an ideal thing, but fully believing what I believe now, as a Treaty honorable to 
Ireland and safeguarding the interests of Ireland.”339 Opponents to the Treaty saw it as a betrayal 
of the Irish Republic which had been declared by Pearse and the other heroes of the Easter 
Rising in the Dublin G.P.O. After all, many men willing to give up their lives in the service of 
the Irish Republican Army felt they were fighting for that Republic – not a position within the 
British Commonwealth only marginally better than would Ireland would have been under Home 
Rule – which had failed to placate the founders of the Irish Volunteers years earlier.340 Griffith’s 
response to this argument was, essentially, that the semantical differences between “Free State” 
and “Republic” were not worth continuing the violent and costly conflict,341 but he was brutally 
attacked by opponents in the Dáil for expressing such sentiments.   
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 The fighting in the Dáil destroyed Griffith, who became prone to boughs of anxiety as his 
health deteriorated, and Blythe argued that:  
[Griffith] had spent years of his life denouncing the Old Irish Party for their lack 
of principle and lack of courage and when all his arguments and epithets were 
turned against himself they wounded him as they would not have wounded 
another.
342
 
  
It soon became apparent to some that the country was drifting towards civil war – split between 
those who supported the Treaty and those who opposed it.  The issue was so divisive that on the 
eve of the vote to ratify the Treaty Griffith felt certain the vote would go in the favor of the 
Treaty, but only by a margin of one vote.
343
 However, the Treaty did pass, and on January 7, 
1922 it was approved in the Dáil by a margin of 64 to 57. Despite the ratification of the Treaty, 
the fighting continued. Only this time, the men of the I.R.A. were not fighting against the British, 
but against each other.  
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Epilogue 
 
 The Irish Civil War, which was full of many ironies, saw a drastic split in the I.R.A. that 
pitted former comrades against one another in yet another bloody conflict. Those who opposed 
the Treaty were led by Rory O’Connor (who served as the Director of Engineering for the 
I.R.A.) Other notables such as Liam Mellows (the director of purchases) and Oscar Traynor 
(Commandant of the Dublin Brigade) supported O’Connor, and the anti-Treaty forces quickly 
took up arms against the Dáil, which they viewed as an illegitimate body for forsaking the Irish 
Republic.
344
 De Valera, Markievicz, and Brugha were three notables, among many, who joined 
the anti-treaty faction. Those in the anti-Treaty faction, referred to by those in the Dáil as the 
“Irregulars,” utilized the tactics they knew and had perfected in the previous years – guerrilla 
warfare.  Many Irregulars still possessed their arms from the war, and others looted them from 
the new formally established army of the Irish Free State. The civil war that ensued was 
extremely bloody and filled with assassinations and reprisal killings, just as the Anglo-Irish War 
had been. Michael Collins, the Commander in Chief of the Army of the Irish Free State, was one 
of the first notables to succumb to the outbreak of violence, and was gunned down on the street 
shortly after the fighting began (and only 10 days after Griffith’s funeral).345  
 Karl Marx once wrote that, “history repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce.” The 
Irish Civil War was both. The Irregulars captured by the forces of the Irish Free State demanded 
to be treated as prisoners of war, just as the Irish Volunteers had after the Easter Rising. Like the 
Volunteers, the Irregulars were denied that treatment, and took to hunger strikes as protest. 
However, Blythe, who remained fiercely devoted to the Government of the Irish Free State, 
described that in response:  
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I then prepared a document and directed the Governor to read it to the prisoners. 
In this I stated that they would not be released, that when they died, the Civil War 
powers that we then possessed would be used to prevent any inquest or any 
announcement of their deaths in the newspapers, and that they would be buried in 
unmarked and unrecorded graves in the prison.
346
 
 
Furthermore, just as the British did before them, the Government of the Irish Free State adopted 
a policy which declared that anyone found in possession of illegal firearms would be executed. 
Erskine Childers, who had been a staunch supporter of the Republican movement since the 
formation of the Irish Volunteers, and who was responsible for the success of the arms landing at 
Howth, was executed by the government of the Irish Free State for simply possessing a 
revolver.
347
 The fighting that broke out was perhaps even more violent than the guerrilla 
campaign against the British, as captured Irregulars were sometimes executed on the spot by the 
forces of the Irish Free State, who like the Black and Tans before them adopted a policy of state 
sponsored terror to destroy the morale of the rebels.  Amazingly, Blythe wrote that in response to 
acts of assassination, sabotage, or guerrilla raids by the Irregulars, “it would be our [the Irish 
Free State’s] duty to supply sufficient counter terror to neutralize the terror which was being 
used against us.”348 
 The great tragedy of the Civil War was the gratuitous loss of life that occurred amongst 
those who had already given so much in the fight for Irish freedom and independence. In one of 
the most poetic episodes of the Civil War, Cathal Brugha, who at the time had occupied Barry’s 
Hotel in Dublin, ordered his men to surrender once they were surrounded by the forces of the 
Irish Free State and as the hotel began burning down around them. However, Brugha himself 
refused to surrender. As one of his comrades described:  
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We kept moving back from the smoke until we reached the back door. We went 
out into the lane. Cathal had a revolver in each hand and kept shouting “No 
Surrender.” He was shot in the hip, the femoral artery being severed.349  
 
Eventually, the forces of the Irish Free State were able to defeat the Irregulars, and on May 24, 
1923 de Valera, who had taken over leadership of the anti-treaty forces, ordered all Irregulars to 
surrender.
350
  Although the forces of the Irish Free State had succeeded, their success came at a 
terrible cost. The Irish Republican Army may have triumphed against the British, but in the end 
it succumbed to itself. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Irish revolted in 1594, 1608, 1641, 1798, 1848, and 1867, but each time failed to 
throw off the English yoke. Yet, while each of these past rebellions failed, the I.R.A. finally 
managed to achieve Irish independence in 1921, even if they had to concede the notion of a 
republic. A large factor of their success is likely due to the increase in Irish nationalism that 
occurred in early 20
th
 century, which laid the foundation for the popular support the I.R.A. 
received during the Anglo-Irish War. The writings of Arthur Griffith and Eoin MacNeill spread 
across the country, and more Irishman began to see Ireland as a nation, rather than a province of 
the United Kingdom.  In 1867, the Fenians failed to win support of the common people, just as 
the Young Ireland movement had in 1848. For the first time, in the 20
th
 century, there was a 
broad base of support for the Irish rebels. The Fianna Éireann, Cumman na mBa, Clan na Gael, 
Gaelic Athletic Association, Gaelic League, Cumman na Gaelheal, and Sinn Fein all formed as a 
result of this increase in nationalism, and all contributed to establishing a sense of national 
identity and desire for self-determination. Young Irishmen could join these organizations, learn 
about their shared cultural heritage and history, and become a part of something greater than 
themselves. Publications like The Irish Volunteer, An t-Óglác, and An Claidheam Soluis all 
helped spread these ideas of Irish nationalism and nationhood, as well as the writings of Griffith 
and MacNeill, and certainly contributed to the eventual success of the Republican movement.   
In the past, Irish rebels had often been either aristocrats or radicals – just as those who 
planned the Easter Rising were intellectuals, labor leaders, or members of the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood (a radical secret society bent on overthrowing the English). The Easter Rising of 
1916 was neither a popular revolution nor a revolution from above, and failed in part because the 
rebels failed to initiate popular revolts in other areas of the country. However, the British 
94 
 
Government’s harsh response to the Rising, especially their execution of the rebel leaders, 
galvanized popular support for the I.R.A. when they waged their guerrilla campaign from 1919 
to 1921.  
In World War I the British suffered 3,190,235 casualties.
351
  Many British people 
personally knew at least one person who had been killed or wounded in the war, and many 
British felt little desire to continue losing soldiers fighting a bloody campaign in Ireland, even if 
the casualties were in comparison far fewer than those suffered in the Great War. Furthermore, 
every previous Irish rebellion had been put down by English forces relatively quickly – the 
rebellion of 1608 lasted under a year, the rebellion of 1641 lasted 7 months, the rebellion of 1798 
lasted 4 months, the rebellion of 1848 lasted mere hours, and the Fenian uprising of 1867 
collapsed before the end of the year. The British had little experience fighting a long, protracted 
guerrilla war Ireland, and in early 1921, after several years of fighting, still saw no end to the 
conflict. To make the situation even more tenuous for the British, this was no ordinary rebellion. 
This was a rebellion in which insurgents could assassinate a British officer and then simply 
disappear into the general population and go about their daily business. On Bloody Sunday, 
Patrick McCrea describes how he woke up early in the morning, met up with some pals from his 
I.R.A. Company, broke into the home where a British officer was staying, killed him, returned to 
his home to have breakfast, and then proceeded to go to Sunday mass as if nothing had 
happened.
352
 The I.R.A.’s guerrilla campaign against the British was both brutal and relentless, 
and over time it became increasingly difficult for the British to separate insurgent from civilian.  
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Moreover, Ireland was not Afghanistan or Africa. It was not some far off British colony, 
or some obscure war that would only make the back page of the London Times. It was a territory 
in the heartland of the United Kingdom. The insurgents spoke English and were citizens of the 
United Kingdom, and although they were not technically Anglo-Saxon, they were not some 
indigenous tribe in a far off land who could be written off as godless savages, even if some 
English tried.  Mao Zedong once wrote that guerrilla warfare is “the inevitable result of the clash 
between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach their limits of their endurance.”353  Not 
only had the Irish reached their limits of their endurance, but after years of fighting the I.R.A. in 
Ireland and the Central Powers in Europe and the Middle East, the British had simply had 
enough as well.  
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